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ABSTRACT
Elnahas, Ahmed M. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2014. Two Essays
in Finance. Co-Major Professors: Thomas H. McInish, Ph.D. and Pankaj K. Jain, Ph.D.
This dissertation comprises two essays. In the first essay we show that accruals
management, sales manipulation, and reckless growth in operating capacity are used in
conjunction with forward splits by hundreds of firms in schemes to manipulate stock
prices that help justify an average 32% increase in executives’ salaries and additional
gains from aggressive stock sales. This is a path to destruction that ultimately leads to
shedding of labor and physical assets and substantial declines in both return on assets and
stock price that often necessitates a reverse stock split. Our results highlight agency
problems in the context of deceptive stock splits that can be part of complex financial
chicanery.
In the second essay we show that during 2000-2004 Doral Financial Corporation, a
leading banking holding company, overstated its pre-tax income by 100 %, which
enabled Doral to report 28 consecutive quarters of record earnings. Our results show that
the proportion of equity related incentives and the timing of option grants likely played a
significant role in prompting Doral’s earnings misstatements. After the restatement
announcement, Doral’s new management adopted several corporate governance
improvements such as increasing the board size and independence and separating the
chair and CEO roles. However, these actions were not sufficient to restore Doral’s prerestatement good reputation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation comprises two essays on finance. The first essay is documenting that
hundreds of firms are conducting manipulative stock splits in order to benefit from
temporary price increases associated with split announcements. The second essay use the
case study of Doral Financial Corporation to investigate the dynamics of managerial
manipulation as well as tactics that firms use to restore their reputation.
In the first essay I show that accruals management, sales manipulation, and reckless
growth in operating capacity are used in conjunction with forward splits by hundreds of
firms in schemes to manipulate stock prices that help executives justify an average 32%
increase in executives’ salaries and additional gains from aggressive stock sales. This is a
path to destruction that ultimately leads to shedding of labor and physical assets and
substantial declines in both return on assets and stock price that often necessitates a
reverse stock split. My results highlight agency problems in the context of deceptive
stock splits that can be part of complex financial chicanery. My results also provide a
novel explanation to reverse stock splits. In addition to reverse split reasons documented
in the literature, my results assume that some reverse splits occur just to make up for
previous managerial misconducts. My results assume that investors could use estimates
of pre-split abnormal hiring, excessive growth, discretionary accruals, and abnormal cash
flows as well as managerial stock selling around split announcements to distinguish
between legitimate and manipulative stock splits.
In the second essay I show that, during 2000-2004, Doral Financial Corporation, a
leading banking holding company, overstated its pre-tax income by 100 percent which

1

enabled it to report 28 consecutive quarters of record earnings. My results show that
Doral’s management announced forward stock splits and in the meantime CEO get rid of
a large proportion of his stock ownership towards the end of the manipulation era. My
results show that the proportion of equity related incentives as well as the timing of
option grants might have played a significant role in triggering Doral’s earnings
misstatements. After the restatement announcement, Doral’s new management adopted
several corporate governance improvements such as increasing board size and
independence and chair/CEO role separation. However, my investigation shows that
these remedies were not enough to restore Doral’s pre-restatement good reputation.

2

Chapter 2

Corporate Greed and Complex Chicanery
1. Introduction
There is a rapidly growing accounting literature on the ways managers manipulate
earnings and stock prices. The vast majority of this literature focuses on detecting and
investigating earnings management through accruals manipulation (Jones, 1991; Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeny, 1995; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Guay, Kothari, and Watts, 1996;
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005).1
Others document that managers also manipulate earnings and stock prices through
real activities management such as reduced or delayed research and development (R&D)
expenditures (Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Bens, Nagar, and
Wong, 2002), overproduction (Thomas and Zhang, 2002), timing of asset sales (Bartov,
1993), and sales manipulation (Roychowdhury, 2006). Fudenberg and Tirole (1995),
Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) show that managers manage
earnings through sales acceleration and shipment schedules changes. Kedia and Philippon
(2009) model the economic consequences of earnings management and fraudulent
accounting. They show that manipulative firms over-invest and over-hire during
misreporting periods in order to pool with high productivity firms. They also show that
when these shenanigans and related mispricing are detected, firms shed labor and capital.

Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as “managers’ use of judgment
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices.” PP 368.
1
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We advance the earnings management literature by proposing that firms may not only
engage in accruals management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) and real activities
management (Roychowdhury, 2006), but also falsely signal the sustainability of their
manipulated earnings by conducting stock splits. Some firms use stock splits to influence
investors’ perceptions about the sustainability of their manipulated earnings power,
thereby undermining the integrity and reliability of financial reporting. The idea that
stock splits are sometimes combined with accounting manipulation has not been explored
in either prior accounting literature or in studies dealing with the reasons for stock splits.
Our method for detecting possibly manipulative firms is similar to Kedia and
Philippon (2009) and Guo, Liu, and Song (2008) who identify possible manipulation
periods using subsequent events. The former use follow-up financial restatement
announcements and the latter use follow-up acquisition decisions. We identify possibly
manipulative splits using subsequent reverse splits. This approach has two advantages.
First, a reverse split signals a manager’s lack of trust that the stock price will rise on its
own (Spudeck and Moyer, 1985). This negative signal raises much stronger concerns
about the purpose of the preceding forward split, which signals a totally opposite
message. Second, in contrast to restatement announcements of which many are minor and
have insignificant long term consequences on firm value, firms in our sample lost on
average 90% of their value between the two identifying events. This dramatic loss raises
serious questions about managerial decisions during the pre-split window and gives a
better experiment to understand self-selected value-destroying managerial decisions.

4

We identify all firms that have a (forward) stock split followed by a reverse split
within the next 10 years (BOTHs).2 BOTHs are the treatment sample. We construct a
matched sample of firms that have a forward split, but do not have a reverse split within
the next ten years (FORWARDs). A key contribution of our paper is to recognize the
complexity of managerial chicanery that can simultaneously include stock splits,
excessive accruals, real activities management, excessive capital expenditure, excessive
executive compensation, and insider stock sales. We investigate the differences in
operating performance and discretionary accruals between BOTHs and FORWARDs at
the time of the forward split. We test the conjecture of Roychowdhury (2006) that
manipulative firms not only manage earnings through accruals management, but also
through real activities management. We also test the conjecture of Kedia and Philippon
(2009) that such firms mimic the appearance of productive firms by hiring and investing
much beyond what is justified by the demand for their products and services.
Importantly, we examine whether the forward split action of BOTHs can be explained by
managers’ desire to receive excessive compensation and increase their gains from selling
the company’s stock.
We find that BOTHs have significantly higher discretionary accruals during the two
years leading up to their initial forward stock splits.3 By combining accruals management
with real activities management through sales manipulation as well as forward splits,

2

Kedia and Philippon (2009) report that the maximum number of restated quarters in
GAO earnings restatement database is 20. They also show that the maximum delay between the
end of the restated period and the restatement announcement is 22 quarters. This implies that a
firm could manage earnings for 5 years and hide for another five and a half years. Therefore, we
include in our sample firms that conduct a reverse split within 10 years from the forward split.
3

We investigate the two year pre-split window following Ke, Haddart, and Petroni
(2003) who show that executives are aware of significant earnings drops two years in advance.
5

BOTHs affect investor perceptions about not only their current earnings power, but also
about its future sustainability. To solidify these misperceptions, BOTHs also participate
in over-hiring and over-investing by temporarily increasing their average employee
strength and capital investment by 53% and 98%, respectively, in the forward stock split
year. We do not find any evidence of accompanying manipulation schemes for the
control sample of FORWARDs, whose gains have a strong foundation of true and
sustainable earnings power.
In the short run, these corporate actions pay off and BOTHs experience a stock price
run-up similar to FORWARDs. The managers of BOTHs, who mimic FORWARDs,
reward themselves handsomely with an average increase of 32% in their salaries during
the forward split year, which is three times the compensation increases for an average
firm (Frydman and Jenter, 2010) or the average increase for similar peer firms in the
FORWARD control sample during their forward split years. Just as important, managers
and other insiders of BOTHs decrease their stock ownership by 15% by selling stock
during the forward split year, a period during which managers genuinely signaling
favorable information are expected to increase their ownership. These short-term benefits
might be offset by the negative long-term consequences. For example, Cohen and
Zarowin (2010) and Kothari, Mizik, and Roychowdhury (2013) show that participating in
multiple earnings management strategies in the context of seasoned equity offering leads
to negative operating performance and returns following the offerings. However,
BOTHs’ managers may avoid these negative outcomes if they leave the firm. Our results
show that 33% of BOTHs change their CEOs within 2 years after the forward split, which

6

is almost twice the 17% rate at which FORWARDs change their CEOs in a comparable
period.
A typical case to illustrate our findings is Doral Financial Corporation, a NYSE-listed
Puerto Rican bank holding company. Doral reported a 20-quarter streak of record
earnings during 2000 to 2004 largely based on a strategy of overstating its income by an
accused $921 million.4 In addition to earnings management, Doral hired an excessive
number of employees, almost doubling its employment from 1,400 to 2,600, and made
excessive investments, increasing property, plant and equipment (PPE) from $40 million
to $150 million. As part of the manipulation schemes, Doral split its stock 3 for 2
effective 12th December 2003. Executive compensation for Doral’s top 5 executives
jumped 61% (amounting to millions of dollars) during the years of the manipulation.
Furthermore, within the few weeks following the split announcement, Doral’s CEO sold
around 40% of his stock. The deception came to an end on 19th April 2005 when Doral
announced a downward earning restatement of more than $100 million. Over the next
few months additional downward restatements totaled about $1 billion. After the
financial chicanery was exposed, Doral’s stock price plummeted from around $50 to less
than $1. The firm faced several compliance and governance issues, including an SEC
settlement of financial fraud charges, an FDIC Cease and Desist Order, and a class-action
lawsuit. A new management team was appointed in 2006 to resolve these issues.
Facilities and employees were shed, reducing PPE to less than $100 million and

4

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-155.htm
7

employees to 1,280. The price drop and strategic corrections episode ends with Doral
conducting a 1 for 20 reverse split effective 20th August 2007.5
Doral is not alone in the good news - bad news game. The “one-two punch” scenario
is also described by Pulliam and Barry (2013) in their Wall Street Journal article. 6 They
report that since 2005, 1,468 firms have announced good news followed by bad news
within a short period. According to the article, SEC filings show that more than half of
those firms experience heavy insider trading before releasing the downward guidance.
Our paper provides rigorous scientific tests of the statistical and economic significance of
this phenomenon and expands upon the set of employed misdeeds.
A simple two-period analytical framework shown in Appendix A demonstrates the
operation of these incentives. The Appendix extends the theoretical model of Kedia and
Philippon (2009) of accruals management to include the effects of real activities
management, executive compensation, and forwards stock splits. Essentially, when
compensation is linked to firm valuation in each period, executives with finite
employment have strong incentives to boost short-term valuation through operational and
reporting manipulations, even though this strategy is clearly sub-optimal for long term
shareholders.
2. Brief literature review
Studies document that some firms engage in earnings management to support their
stock price and/or affect investors’ perceptions before important corporate actions such as

5

Apart from the Doral case discussed in the introduction, Diamond Foods is another recent
example. The top executives manipulated earnings to beat earnings forecasts and reap millions of
dollars in cash bonus and other compensation. See the full story at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303848104579310690154877108.
6

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303376904579135782687348574
8

seasonal equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998b), management buyouts (Perry
and Williams, 1994), initial public offerings (IPOs) (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a, and
Shivakumar, 2000), stock-for-stock mergers (Erickson and Wang, 1999, and Louis,
2004), acquisitions (Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007), and repurchase
announcements (Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008).
Brennan and Copeland (1988) maintain that forward stock splits can credibly signal
positive information because it is costly for firms without favorable information to signal
falsely. Lower stock prices after a split increase investors’ transaction costs and increase
delisting and disinvestment risks. Therefore, stock splits are a popular corporate action
only among firms that experience high growth rates and whose stock prices are expected
to rise (Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman, 1984; Desai and Jain, 1997). According to the
stock split signaling hypothesis, managers declare stock splits to convey favorable private
information about the current and expected future prospects of the firm (McNichols and
Dravid, 1990; and Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman, 1984). In this paper, we show that for
many firms these studies on forward stock splits have underestimated the importance of
agency problems.
Compared to non-acquiring firms, Guo, Liu, and Song (2008) provide evidence that
firms conducting stock-financed acquisitions are more likely to use stock splits as a
manipulative tool to defer stock price corrections. Louis and Robinson (2005) also study
the combination of accrual signals and stock split signals to study managerial optimism
and opportunism.

9

What has not been recognized is that several hundred firms that conduct forward splits
actually restate their earnings and many end up conducting reverse splits.7 Grinblatt,
Masulis, and Titman (1984) theoretically assert that managers of some overvalued firms
might mimic successful firms and conduct forward splits to temporarily boost their stock
price to sell stock.8 Akerlof’s (1970) theorem assumes that firms would continue to
mimic as long as the number of good undervalued firms dominates the number of firms
that signal falsely. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first empirical
calibration of the proportion of firms with false forward split signals referred to in the
above literature.
We argue that some CEOs (agents) strategically use the split signal in an effort to
cause investors and other analysts to overvalue their skills and achievements. Our
argument is consistent with the work of Holmström (1999) and Holmström and Milgrom
(1991) who argue that managers can take unobserved actions that affect current
performance to influence stakeholders’ learning and short term stock price movements,
both of which are key determinants of their direct compensation and stock based
compensation. Analyses of these interlinks and their relation to executive compensation
are essential to reveal the full impact and extent of agency problems between incumbent
managers and long term shareholders of a firm as theorized by Jensen and Meckling
(1976), especially in the context of overpriced or manipulated equity values (Jensen,
2005).

7

We find that 670 firms in the GAO database restated their earning within 5 years of
conducting a forward split.
8

Note that if a forward split has genuine intentions, it is more sensible to buy the stock to
benefit from its higher sustainable future earnings.
10

Based on the analytical framework shown in the Appendix, we conjecture that the
motivation behind concurrently using stock splits in addition to traditional earnings
management techniques is the connection between reported or project earnings and
executives’ cash or stock based compensation. Hall and Liebman (1998) discuss the large
and increasing median exposure of CEOs’ wealth to firms’ stock prices that motivates
managers to engage in earnings management according to Cheng and Warfield (2005).
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Healy (1985) study earnings accrual policies
followed by managers and show that they are related to the incentives of their bonus
contracts. 9 Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that periods of very high accruals are
associated with sales of shares by insiders, and that these periods are followed by low
earnings and stock returns. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) argue that top executives’ stock
option exercises could create incentives for manipulation and indicate future bad news
and disappointing earnings.
Similarly, John and Lang (1991) show that insiders’ selling around dividend initiation
announcements predicts negative future returns and the possibility of manipulation
because insiders with promising future information should participate in insider buying
rather than selling before dividend initiations. Taking the cue from these papers, we
analyze changes in insider stock ownership in the periods surrounding forward splits to
test if managers of BOTHs believe in a bright future or merely use stock splits to convey
a false signal as part of their effort to temporarily boost stock prices.

9

Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006) and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010)
do not find a relation between executives’ equity incentives and earnings frauds However, these
papers do not examine complex manipulation schemes that may include real earnings
management and forward splits.
11

Chicanery is not sustainable in the long term and the literature points to its possible
aftermath. Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012) propose that the likelihood and speed of
CEO turnover are positively related to a firm’s earnings management because boards
discipline managers who manage earnings aggressively. We conjecture that aggressive
manipulation is followed by harsh reversals. Accruals are reversed by restatements,
hiring by firing, capital investment by disinvestment, and we show that forward splits are
reversed by reverse splits. This scenario adds a novel explanation to the prior literature on
reasons why reverse splits take place. For example, Bacon, Salandro, and Shin (1993),
and Peterson and Peterson (1992) document that corporate managers mention image
improvement, marketability, increased ability to attract different segments of investors,
and meeting stock market listing requirements as the main reasons for reverse splits.
Many empirical studies such as Lamoureux and Poon (1987), and Han (1995) find that
those stated objectives are not really achieved with reverse splits. Our analysis shows
that, for many firms, a reverse split results from prior misdeeds in corporate
gamesmanship.
3. Data, sample formation and hypotheses development.
3.1. Data
Using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for the period from
1980 through 2011, we identify all stock splits (including stock dividends of more than
25%) and all reverse splits by NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed firms. 10 Our initial
treatment sample (BOTHs) comprises the 314 firms that have a forward split followed by
a reverse split within 10 years. We search Lexis Nexis and various other sources to

10

Desai and Jain (1997) show that results are similar when the stock dividend and the
stock split samples are analyzed separately.
12

eliminate all cases for which splits or reverse splits are associated with spin-offs and
mergers, reducing the sample to 289 BOTHs.11 We are able to obtain accounting data
from Compustat for 251 of these firms, which is our final sample of BOTHs. We collect
the executive compensation paid to the top 5 executives of each sample firm and CEO
turnover from the COMPUSTAT ExecuComp database and supplement missing values
manually from the SEC/Edgar filings.12 Both ExecuComp and SEC/Edgar provide data
after 1992. We acquire financial restatement announcement data from the U.S.
Government accountability office (GAO) for the period 1997-2006.
Figure 1 indicates that a significant proportion of firms use accruals management and
real activities management prior to forward stock splits by. The plot shows the percentage
of forward stock split firms that concurrently participate in accruals and real activities
management during the year preceding the forward split. Following Kothari, Mizik, and
Roychowdhury (2013), the sample of firms shown in the plot is constructed by selecting
forward split firms that have positive discretionary accruals and negative abnormal
operating cash flows as a proxy of real activities management during the pre-split year.
Our results show that more than 10% (20% in some years) of forward stocks splits are
conducted by firms that participate in both accruals and real activities management in the
pre-split year. This figure increases significantly to more than 40% when we consider
firms that potentially use at least one of the two earnings management techniques.

11

Other
sources
used
include
among
others,
http://finance.yahoo.com,
www.thefreelibrary.com, www.globenewswire.com, and www.getsplithistory.com.
12
Executive compensation data is usually reported in firms’ proxy statements, i.e., SEC
filing DEF 14A.
13
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Figure 1.
Pervasiveness of accruals and real activities management in the year prior to the stock split
year
Using a sample of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ split firms during 1980-2011, for each firm
with a stock split in a given year, we indicate (for the previous year) the percentage of stock split
firms with (1) both income increasing (positive) discretionary accruals and abnormally low
operating cash flows, and (2) either income increasing (positive) discretionary accruals and
abnormally low operating cash flows. The percentage of split firms is measured on the right
vertical axis and the level of the S&P 500 is measured on the left vertical axis. The light grey
areas indicate recessions as identified by the NBER.

The number of firms potentially managing their earnings prior to stock splits is
independent of the market wide conditions measured by S&P500 Index and National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) quarterly recession classification. In other words,
the likelihood of observing high positive discretionary accruals and negative abnormal
operating cash flows before forward splits is not associated with exceptional market
conditions. Rather, our results discussed later show that the combination of earning
management, real activities management, and forward splits is more likely associated
with firm-specific incentives to boost executive compensation and short-term stock
prices. Figure 2 shows the number of BOTHs for each year.
14

The increasing number of BOTHs is not fully explained by market upturns in forward
split years or market downturns in reverse split years of BOTHs. Although there is a
temporary spike in the number of yearly reverse splits of BOTHs in 2002, the vast
majority of BOTHs have their reverse splits during 1990s and mid-2000s —two periods
that are known to be up markets. Results presented in the following sections provide
evidence that unwarranted forward splits, in combination with other earnings
management techniques conducted by the sample firms, are more likely explanations for
BOTHs than market conditions.
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Number of BOTHs per year, 1980-2011
For each year we indicate the number of firms with a forward split that have a reverse split within
the subsequent 10 years (BOTHs). BOTHs are measured on the right vertical axis and the level of
the S&P 500 is measured on the left vertical axis. The light grey areas indicate recessions as
identified by the NBER.
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3.2. Control samples
To demonstrate the manipulative nature of forward splits conducted by BOTHs, we
need to show that other comparable firms are not engaging in similar misleading
behaviors. We use four control samples for this purpose; these control samples also help
rule out various alternative explanations for our results:
1. Our first control sample is FORWARDs. We begin with the set of stock splits
during 1980-2003, excluding the 314 BOTHs. This subset of firms has forward splits, but
no reverse split in the subsequent 10 years and hence the designation FORWARDs.13 We
match each BOTH with a FORWARD based on industry (first 3 digits of the SIC code),14
size, and price following Guo, Liu and Song (2008). The matched control firm's market
value and pre-split stock price must be within 70% to 130% of those of the BOTH firm,
10 days before the firm’s forward split effective day. Our final treatment and control
samples comprise 251 pairs of BOTHs and FORWARDs, respectively.
2. Our second control sample (FORWARD_NEGs) is constructed without
replacement from the pool remaining after we construct the FORWARD sample. We
begin by selecting all firms that have a negative stock return over both the first three
months and the first year following the forward split and also do not have a reverse split
within 10 years of the forward split. We match these firms with the BOTHs based on split
year, price, size, and industry, producing a matched sample of 251 firms. The purpose of
constructing this control group is to test whether BOTHs’ use of tactics to artificially

13

The 2003 cutoff is used because firms conduct forward splits after 2003 can turn into

BOTHs.
14

Matching firms in the 3 SIC category are available for 184 cases; we match by 2 and 1
digit SIC codes for the remaining firms.
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boost stock prices results in destruction of the firms in the long run and whether the lack
of such tactics at FORWARD_NEGs allow them to easily recover from temporarily poor
performance.
3. Our third control sample (REVERSEs) begins with the sample of approximately
2,350 firms that have a reverse split that is not preceded by a forward split in the previous
10 years. We match these with BOTHs based on reverse split year, size, price, and
industry to produce a matched sample of 251 firms. This control sample is again helpful
in uniquely identifying BOTH firms as the ones engaging in misconduct and the use of
forward splits as a cover.
4. To address the concerns in Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2013) that Jones models
of discretionary accruals are misspecified for quarterly data because they do not account
for accruals caused by firm growth, we use annual data throughout and also construct a
control group matched on operating performance, sales growth, industry, and year. We
also show in Table 1 that BOTHs are not significantly different from the control groups
of FORWARDs and FORWARD_NEGs with respect to sales growth or market to book
value.
Table 1 presents a comparative description of forward splits done by BOTHs,
FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs. As shown in Panel A, we identify 314 BOTHs
and construct a sample of 251 BOTHs and corresponding matched firms with full data
availability. Table 1, Panel B, reports a distribution of splitting firms among different
stock exchanges—NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. NASDAQ firms represent 70% and
NYSE firms represent 22% of the BOTHs. Table 1, Panel C, shows the distribution of
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stock splits across the range of split factors. Similar to Byun and Rozeff (2003), the most
common forward split factor used by all three samples is 2:1.
Table 1, Panel D1, reports average pre-split price and pre-split capitalization. BOTHs,
FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs have a pre-split average market capitalization of
$234 million, $264 million and $129 million, respectively, and pre-split average price of
around $29, $32 and $23, respectively. Table 1, Panel D2, reports various firm
characteristics measured for BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs in the year
immediately preceding the forward split year.
These figures assure the comparability of the BOTHs group to the matched groups of
FORWARDs and FORWARD_NEGs in the benchmark period. To eliminate the
alternative hypothesis that BOTHs are riskier or experience exceptionally good times, we
show that BOTHs are not significantly superior to control firms with respect to leverage,
research and development expenditures, market-to-book value, sales growth, and
liquidity. In the next section, we show that much of the exuberance and excessive pay
increases of BOTHs is based on accruals and real activities management whereas the
forward split actions of FORWARDs and FORWARD_NEGs are based on
fundamentally strong performance.
3.3. Hypotheses
The main question of this paper is whether some firms use forward splits as an
additional tool to manipulate short-term stock prices at the expense of long-term
stakeholders.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
We report statistics for our treatment sample of firms that conduct both a forward split
and a subsequent reverse split within 10 years (BOTHs) and two matched control
samples—FORWARDs, firms that conduct only a forward split and no reverse split,
and FORWARD_NEGs, firms that conduct only a forward split and no reverse split
and also have negative returns over both the first three months and the first year
following the forward split. As shown in Panel A, of the initial count of 314 BOTHs,
251 that have both CRSP and Compustat data are included in our final sample. Panels
B and C show the breakdown of our final sample by listing exchange and splitting
factor, respectively. Panel D1 reports means of our matching variables, the pre-split
price (in USD) and size (in million USD). Panel D2 reports means of firm
characteristics for the three samples combined. Leverage is long term debt divided by
TA. RDEX/TA is expenditures on research and development divided by TA. Sales
Growth is the percentage change in net sales. MTBV is the market to book value
calculated as end of year stock price divided by book value per share. Current Ratio is
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Variables are trimmed at 1st and 99th
percentiles. We designate the year of the split as t = 0. All of these variables are for
year t-1 except for Sales Growth, which is for t = 0.
BOTH
FORWARD
FORWARD_NEG
(treatment)
(control1)
(control2)
Panel A. Number of BOTHs and matched firms
All BOTHs
314
Final sample
251
251
251
Panel B. Number (and percentage) of BOTHs and matched firms by exchange (n =
251)
NYSE
55 (22%)
86 (35 %)
77 (30%)
AMEX
20 (8%)
19 (7%)
18 (7%)
NASDAQ
176 (70%)
146 (58 %)
156 (63%)
Panel C: Number of BOTHs and matched firms by splitting factor (n = 251)
SF < 2:1
100
99
148
2:1
110
112
84
2:1 < SF
41
40
19
Panel D1. Matching variables on the effective date of the initial forward split (n = 251)
Price pre-split
48.9
47.8
35.4
Size pre-split
5,223
5,224
3,400
Splitting
1.99
2.18
1.97
factor
Panel D2. Firm characteristics as of the year prior to the split year (n = 251)
Leverage
0.15
0.16
0.14
RDEX/TA
0.06
0.06
0.05
Sales Growth
0.10
0.09
0.09
MTBV
7.2
8.2
3.5
Current Ratio
3.9
3.1
3
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This question has three main elements; manipulative act, manipulative intent based on
incentives, and destructive consequences. 15 We have three groups of hypotheses that
address these three elements. First, we investigate whether BOTHs engage in a plethora
of activities, including forward splits, to temporarily boost stock prices. Second, we
examine whether managers personally benefit from these corporate actions. Third, we
show what happens in the aftermath of these corporate actions.
1. Action (Manipulation hypotheses): If the BOTH treatment group comprises
manipulative firms that split to falsely signal the sustainability of their already
manipulated earnings, we should observe evidence of commonly used manipulative
tactics employed by such firms around their forward stock splits. Hence, we test the
following hypotheses:
H1a: BOTHs engage in aggressive accruals management prior to their initial
forward split.
H1b: BOTHs experience unusually low operating cash flows due to sales
manipulation and engage in excessive hiring and investment prior to their initial
forward split.
2. Intent (Incentive hypotheses): If managers of the treatment group firms
intentionally manipulate, there should be strong incentives to do so, leading to the
following hypothesis:
H2a: Executive compensation for BOTHs increases around the time of the forward
split.

15

We borrow this concept from criminal law, where any crime has four elements; act,
intent, concurrence and causation (Samaha, 2010). We investigate concurrence of manipulative
tactics and their intents through testing both during the same pre-split period.
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It is important to separate manipulation scenarios from over-optimism scenarios in our
analysis. Both manipulative and overconfident executives could hire and invest more or
even negotiate higher compensations. However, only manipulative executives would
need excessive accruals or sell their own stocks simultaneously with the aforementioned
decisions including forward splits. In other words a manipulative executive would sell the
firm’s stock whereas an optimistic executive should buy it. Thus, the following
hypothesis provides a clear distinction between the manipulation versus the overconfidence hypotheses:
H2b: BOTHs’ insiders sell their stock around the time of the forward splits.
3. Consequences (The aftermath hypotheses): The focus of our third set of tests is
whether, after reaping the temporary benefits of forward splits, the reversal in a firm’s
fortune starts much closer to the forward split date when the firm is expected to do well,
instead of being closer to the reverse split date that occurs later. If our conjectures about
BOTHs’ unreliable financial reports, artificial dramatic growth and misdeeds are correct,
then the post-split period should experience a dramatic decline and higher rates of
internal or external auditor punishments (restatements), operating reversals (firing of
employees and asset sales), and boards of directors punishment (CEO turnover).
H3a: Operating performance of BOTHs dramatically declined in the post-forward
split period.
H3b: BOTHs shed employees and capital in the post-forward split period.
H3c: The likelihood and speed of CEO turnover is higher for BOTHs.
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4. Analysis and results
We present our analysis in three sub-sections relating to the action, intent, and
consequences hypotheses.
4.1. BOTHs’ corporate actions
4.1.1. Earnings management through discretionary accruals
This section presents the results of our tests of the BOTHs’ series of corporate actions
such as accruals management and real activities management accompanied by stock splits
all aimed at temporarily boosting stock prices. We seek to determine whether BOTHs
participate in accruals management. We follow Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b)
and calculate total accruals (T_ACR) as follows (using the Compustat item numbers
indicated in parentheses):
𝑇_𝐴𝐶𝑅 ≡ ∆[𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠(2) + 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 (3) +
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(68)] − ∆[𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 (70) +
𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(71) + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠(72)

(1)

We identify discretionary accruals as the residual, 𝜺𝒊 , from the model in Dechow,
Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), which modifies Jones (1991).16 Specifically, for each
calendar year and two-digit SIC-code industry, we estimate the following regression
equation:
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑅 𝑖 /𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 = 𝛽1 1⁄𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 (∆ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶)/𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 +
𝛽3 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 /𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖

(2)

where the dependent variable in the first step, T_ACR, is the total accrual defined above.
TA is total assets at the beginning of the year. ΔSale is the change in sales. ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶 is the
16

The modified version of the Jones (1991) model accounts for the possibility of
managerial discretionary revenues. The original Jones (1991) model has an implicit assumption
that discretion is not exercised over revenues. For more details, see Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney
(1995).
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change in accounts receivables. PPE is property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of
the year. The main variable of interest, ε, is the error term that represents discretionary
accrual over and above the fitted value of expected or normal non-discretionary accruals.
We follow the literature in scaling all variables by TA at the beginning of the year.
Table 2, Panel A, reports the average discretionary accruals for BOTHs and the
control samples. BOTHs have abnormally high discretionary accruals. We measure the
discretionary accruals for t = -2 through t = 0. The mean of discretionary accruals is
0.37% for the pre-split year and 0.34% for the split year in the last column for BOTHs,
each is much higher than the FORWARDs’ control sample mean of 0.10% and 0.05%,
respectively. 17 BOTHs’ discretionary accruals are also significantly higher than those of
FORWARD_NEGs’ control sample, which have mean discretionary accruals of 0.09 and
0.11 for the pre-split year and split year, respectively.
This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1a that BOTHs aggressively engage in
managing earnings through higher discretionary accruals. Next, we investigate whether
BOTHs’ actions are justified by any extraordinary spurts in operating performance. We
test the difference between operating performance of BOTHs and the control samples
during the three year window starting two years before the split year and including the
split year, following Lie (2005) and Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008). Our measure of
operating performance is return on assets (ROA), which is defined as operating income
divided by cash-adjusted total assets (i.e., total assets minus cash and short-term
investments). If BOTHs’ actions are genuine, we should observe similar ROAs for
BOTHs and the control firms in the pre-split period.

17

We discuss the mean results, but medians are included for reference.
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Table 2. Pre-split discretionary accruals, operating performance, and restatements
Panel A reports Discretionary accruals for BOTHs, FORWARDs, FORWARD_NEGs
and a control group matched on sales growth and ROA following Collins, Pungaliya,
and Vijh (2013). The means of abnormal accruals are calculated as the residual from the
model in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), which modifies Jones (1991). Panel B
reports mean Pre-split operating performance (ROA). ROA is operating income divided
by cash-adjusted total assets. The columns in Panels A and B show the values of the
variables relative to the split year. Finally, in Panel C, we show the percentage of firms
that announce financial restatement during 1997-2006 according to the GAO database.
Variables are trimmed at 1st and 99th percentiles. We report p-values (in parenthesis) of
the test of the null hypothesis of equality of means (using a t test).
N
t = -2
t = -1
t=0
Panel A. Discretionary accruals
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
Sales-growth/ROA
matched
BOTH minus FORWARDs

192
173
163
207

BOTH minus
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus Salesgrowth /ROA matched

0.11
0.10
-0.05
0.02

0.37
0.10
0.09
0.05

0.34
0.05
0.11
-0.01

0.01
(0.934)
-0.16
(0.858)
0.10
(0.363)

0.26
(0.051)
0.28
(0.037)
0.31
(0.007)

0.29
(0.002)
0.23
(0.030)
0.36
(0.000)

Panel B: Pre-split operating performance (ROA)
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTH minus FORWARDs

231
211
185

BOTH minus
FORWARD_NEGs

-4.72%
4.40%
5.90%
-9.12%
(0.000)
-12.2%
(0.000)

-0.84%
6.13%
5.78%
7.00%
(0.000)
-7.8%
(0.000)

-0.42%
5.97%
5.87%
6.38%
(0.000)
-6.29%
(0.000)

Panel C: Post-split restatement announcement percentages
BOTHs

% of firms restating
earnings

37%

FORWARDs FORWARD_NEGs

26%

22%

24

BOTH
minus
FORWARD
11%
(0.000)

Instead, BOTHs have mean ROAs of -0.42% during the split year, which is much
lower than 5.97% (5.87%) for the FORWARDs (FORWARD_NEGs) control sample in
the corresponding year. The levels of BOTHs’ ROAs are lower despite their potential
inflation through discretionary accrual management as discussed previously. To
understand the economic significance of these results, the mean excess discretionary
accrual of around 0.34% in the split year implies that reported ROA would be 80% worse
at -0.76% with the excess discretionary accruals than the reported -0.42.. This result lends
support to our idea that BOTHs conducted premature stock splits without support from
actual operating performance.
To further examine the manipulative act of BOTHs, we use GAO restatement
announcements to investigate whether BOTHs are more likely to have restatements than
our control samples. If BOTHs participate in financial chicanery around the split year, we
expect them to announce more earnings restatements during the subsequent years. In
Table 2, Panel A, we report the number of firms that announce financial restatements
during 1997-2006 according to GAO data. Our results show that 37% of BOTHs
announce earnings restatements, which is significantly higher than control sample
restatements at the 1% level. Although GAO restatement-announcement data are not
available for our entire sample period, these results lend further support to our hypothesis
that BOTHs conduct stock splits during manipulative years in conjunction with reported
earnings management in a complex scheme.
Table 2, Panel B, addresses the concerns in Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2013) that
the Jones models of discretionary accruals is misspecified because it does not account for
accruals caused by firm growth. Our results show that BOTHs have significantly higher
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discretionary accruals than the growth and performance matched sample. This shows that
our results are not driven by a mismatch in growth characteristics.
Further, we formally test whether BOTHs’ use of discretionary accruals is justified by
their size, operating performance, or other control variables by following the
methodology of Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008). We estimate the following OLS
regression:
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + ∑2011
(3)
𝑦=1980 𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜺𝒊
where Discretionary Accruals is estimated as the residuals from equation (2).
BOTHdummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for BOTHs and 0 for
FORWARDs. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Leverage is the ratio
of long term debts to TA. ROA is return on assets. Sales is net sales. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient for BOTHdummy in Table 3 provides evidence that
BOTHs have unjustified high discretionary accruals compared to the FORWARDs. The
insignificant coefficient of Size is not surprising because Size is one of our matching
variables.
Results also show that Leverage, Operating Performance, and Sales do not help in
explaining the significantly high positive Discretionary Accruals reported for BOTHs
around their stock splits. BOTHs high Discretionary Accruals are not justified by their
large size, exceptionally high sales, or leverage.
4.1.2. Real activities management: Sales manipulation
Roychowdhury (2006) proposes and shows that firms that manipulate sales
experience unusually low cash flows from operations. We use this conjecture in our
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Table 3. Determinants of discretionary accruals
We present the results of the OLS regressions of the determinants of the discretionary
accruals following Gong, Louis and Sun (2008). Discretionary Accruals is estimated
as the residuals from Jones (1991) modified model (equation (2)). BOTHdummy is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for BOTHs and 0 for FORWARDs. Size is
the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Leverage is the ratio of long term
debts to TA. ROA is return on assets. Sales is net sales. Variables are trimmed at the
1st and 99th percentiles. P-values are provided in parentheses. Coefficients of all
models are estimated with time fixed effects.
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
Intercept
0.02
0.19
0.04
(0.868)
(0.307)
(0.844)
BOTHdummy

0.31
(0.010)

0.27
(0.029)

𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1

-0.00
(0.926)

0.00
(0.987)

𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1

0.08
(0.808)

0.06
(0.839)

𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1

-0.01
(0.031)

-0.01
(0.071)

𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1

0.00
0.993

0.00
(0.962)

N

368

365

365

Adj. R sq.

0.02

0.01

0.03
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context to test whether BOTHs participate in real activities management in addition to
accruals management. We calculate abnormal cash flows of BOTHs and control samples
as the residual, 𝝊𝒊 , from a model that divides the cash flows into normal and abnormal
components due to real activities management. Specifically, for each calendar year and
two-digit SIC-code industry, we estimate the following equation:
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 /𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 = α0 + α1 (1/𝑇𝐴t−1 ) + 𝛽1 (St /𝑇𝐴t−1 ) + 𝛽2 (∆ 𝑆𝑡 /𝑇𝐴𝑡−1 ) + 𝜐𝑡

(4)

where 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 (Compustat data item 308) is cash flows from operations during year t; TA
(Compustat data item 6) is total assets at the end of year t-1. St (Compustat data item 12)
is net sales. ∆𝑆𝑡 is the change in sales. We calculate normal cash flow for each firm-year
as the fitted value from the above regression and the abnormal cash flow as the residual,
ε.
Table 4, Panel A, reports average abnormal cash flow for BOTHs and the control
samples. We measure the abnormal cash flows for t = -2 through t = 0 relative to the
forward split year. Mean residual cash flows for BOTHs are abnormally low at -0.03%
and -0.28% for the two years immediately preceding the stock-split year.18
On the other hand, control sample firms have mean residual cash flows of 0.13% in
the year immediately preceding the stock split year and more than 0,04% two years
preceding the split year. This evidence supports the hypothesis that BOTHs’ managers
not only participate in accruals management, but also participate in real activities
management in the form of sales manipulation.

18

The failure to reject the null hypothesis that abnormal cash flows equal 0 during the split year is
consistent with Barton and Simko (2002) who argue that there is a negative relationship between number of
shares outstanding and earnings management.
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Table 4. Pre-split abnormal cash flow
In Panel A, for the years t = -2 … 0, where 0 is the year of the forward split, for
BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs, we present the means of abnormal
cash flow estimated as the residuals from Roychowdhury (2006) model. We test the
null hypothesis of equality of means (using a t test) for pairs being tested. In Panel B
we present results of the OLS regression of 𝜺𝒕 on its determinants. BOTHdummy is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for BOTHs and 0 for FORWARDs. Size is the
natural logarithm of market capitalization. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt to
TA. ROA is return on assets. Sales is net sales. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. We report p-values (in parenthesis).
Panel A. Pre-split abnormal cash flow (𝜺𝒕 )
N
164
128
129

BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

t = -2
-0.03
0.13
0.13
-0.16
(0.056)
-0.16
(0.056)

t = -1
-0.28
0.06
0.04
-0.34
(0.002)
-0.32
(0.002)

t=0
0.14
0.20
0.16
-0.06
(0.345)
-0.02
(0.704)

Panel B. Determinants of abnormal cash flow
Variables
Intercept
BOTHdummy

(1)
0.03
( 0.772)
-0.35
( 0.007)

(2)
-0.17
( 0.315)

𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
N
Adj. R sq.

263
0.03
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-0.02
( 0.571)
0.47
( 0.113)
0.02
(0.000)
0.00
( 0.402)

(3)
-0.04
(820)
-0.20
( 0.089)
-0.02
(0.501)
0.49
(0.094)
0.02
(0.000)
0.00
( 0.373)

260
0.21

260
0.23

Further, we formally test whether BOTHs’ pre-split abnormal cash flow is justified by
their sales, operating performance, or other control variables by following the intuition of
Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008). We estimate the following OLS regression:
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐹𝑂 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + ∑2011
𝑦=1980 𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜺𝒊

(5)

where Abnormal CFO is estimated as the residuals from Equation (4) and the other
variables are the same as defined previously. Results reported in Table 4, Panel B,
provide evidence that BOTHs have excessively negative abnormal cash flows compared
to control sample firms. Size, Leverage and Sales do not help in explaining the
significantly negative abnormal cash flows generated by BOTHs prior to their stock
splits. Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), Abnormal CFO is positively related to
ROA, indicating that firms with high earnings are less prone to offer excessive price
discounts or lenient credit terms.
4.1.3. Real activities management, over-hiring and over-investment
The forward splits of the BOTHs provide a way to test the relation between financial
chicanery and reckless growth in employee strength and capital investment. Similar to the
accounting fraudsters modeled by Kedia and Philippon (2009), we conjecture that
BOTHs temporarily over-invest and over-hire when conducting a forward split, collect
higher compensation, and, subsequently, shrink after being detected. Following the
methodology of Kedia and Philippon (2009), we compare the hiring decision measured
by the growth rate of the number of employees (COMPUSTAT data item 29). We also
compare the investment decisions of BOTHs and control firms during the pre-split period
using two measures—the growth rate in the level of property, plant and equipment
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(COMPUSTAT data item 8), and the growth rate of new capital expenditures on
property, plant and equipment (COMPUSTAT data item 30).
Table 5 lends support to notion that BOTHs engage in real activities management. In
the split year and the year preceding their forward split, BOTHs hire a mean of 13% and
28% more employees, respectively, than FORWARDs as shown in Table 5, Panel A.
Results reported in Table 5, Panel B, show that BOTHs also increase their investment in
PPE by a mean of 65% and 60% (73% and 62%), respectively, more than FORWARDs
(FORWARD_NEGs). Further, results in Table 5, show that the differences between
average growth rates of BOTHs and control firms are statistically significant at the 1%
level, indicating that BOTHs hire and invest significantly more than similar peer firms.
Aggressive hiring and investment is only a problem or a sign of misconduct if it is
unjustified. We formally test whether BOTHs over-hire and over-investment, closely
following the intuition in Bartov (1993) and Herrman, Inoue, and Thomas (2003).
to account for potentially high demand, capacity constraints, or exogenous variables as
additional variables not controlled for in the matching technique. We estimate the
following OLS regressions:
𝛥 𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝛥𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿 𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽7 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑡 + ∑

2011

𝑦=1980

𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜀

𝛥 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸 𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽7 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡 + ∑

2011

𝑦=1980

+ 𝛽7 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 + ∑
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𝑦=1980

(7)

𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜀

𝛥 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝛥𝑃𝑃𝐸 𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡
2011

(6)

𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜀

(8)

Table 5
Employees, PPE, and capital expenditures
For the years t = -2, -1, and 0, where 0 is the year of the forward split, we provide the means
for the growth in the number of employees in Panel A, growth in property, plant and equipment
in Panel B, and growth in capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment in Panel C.
Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In each panel we compare the values of
the indicated variables for the BOTHS, FORWARDS, and FORWARD_NEGs. We report p-values
(in parentheses) for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of means (using a t test).
N
t = -2
t = -1
t=0
Panel A. Growth in number of employees.
BOTHs
200
30%
38%
53%
FORWARDs
185
19%
25%
24%
FORWARD_NEGs
165
15%
20%
27%
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
11%
13%
28%
(0.03)
(0.029)
(0.000)
BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs
15%
18%
26%
(0.006)
(0.003)
(0.010)
Panel B. Growth in property, plant and equipment (PPE).
64%
100%
BOTHs
213
35%
36%
FORWARDs
199
FORWARD_NEGs
26%
27%
177
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
28%
65%
(0.002)
(0.000)
BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs
38%
74%
(0.000)
(0.000)

98%
39%
36%
60%
(0.000)
63%
(0.000)

Panel C. Growth in capital expenditure on PPE.
86%
129%
BOTHs
195
FORWARDs
177
49%
64%
FORWARD_NEGs
165
49%
50%
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
36%
65%
(0.040)
(0.002)
BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs
36%
72%
(0.042)
(0.000)

130%
65%
59%
67%
(0.001)
72%
(0.000)
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where for the split-year dependent variable, ΔEMPL is the percentage change in the
number of employees, ΔCAPE is the percentage change in capital expenditure on plant,
property and equipment, and ΔPPE is the percentage change in plant, property and
equipment. BOTHdummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for BOTHs and 0
for FORWARDs. ΔSales is change in sales, ΔROA is the change in return on assets, and
Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. t indicates a value for the split year.
Industry-wide growth in sales and capacity are also included as control variables,
because if BOTHs’ capacity increases are based on genuine demand projections, other
firms in the industry should also expand capacity. We identify the industry to which a
firm belongs by its 2-digit SIC code and calculate a number of variables, excluding
BOTHs. ΔIndustrySales is the contemporaneous equally-weighted average change in the
industry’s sales for all firms with the same 2-digit SIC code, ΔIndustryEMPL is the
equally-weighted change in the industry’s number of employees for all firms with the
same 2-digit SIC code, ΔIndustryCAPE is the change in the industry’s capital
expenditures, and ΔIndustryPPE is the change in the industry’s PPE. Finally, TD are
time-dummy indicator variables for year fixed effects.
Results reported in Table 6 lend further support to the real activities management
hypothesis. Although product demand, capacity constraints, and industry growth are
positively related to hiring and capital expenditures, the level of excessive hiring and
investments at BOTHs is not fully explained by the firm-specific sales and operating
growth, firms’ current policies, and industrial factors. The coefficient of BOTHdummy is
significantly and positively related to employees’ growth at the 5% level and to growth in
capital expenditures and growth in PPE at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Determinants of changes in employees, expenditures on PPP, and the level of PPE
ΔEMPL is the percentage change in the number of employees, ΔCAPE is the percentage
change in capital expenditure on plant, property and equipment, and ΔPPE is the percentage
change in plant, property and equipment. For a combined sample of BOTHs and FORWARDs,
we regress each of these three variables for year t, in turn, against the following set of
independent variables: BOTHdummy, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a
BOTH and the value of 0 if the firm is a FORWARD; ΔSales, the change in sales; Size, the
natural logarithm of market capitalization at the beginning of the year; ΔROA, the lag change in
return on assets; ΔIndustrySales, the change in industrial sales; ΔIndustryEMPL, the change in
the firm’s industry’s employees; IndustryCAPE, the change in the industry’s capital
expenditures; IndustryPPE, the change in the industry’s PPE. We denote the year of the split as
t and the previous year as t-1. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-values are
provided in parentheses. Coefficients of all models are estimated with time fixed effects.
ΔEMPLt
ΔCAPEt
ΔPPEt
Variables

(1)

(2

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

Intercept

0.24
0.48
0.36
(0.005) (0.003) (0.039)

0.43
1.02
0.79
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006)

0.67
0.79
0.62
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)

BOTH
dummy

0.39
(0.001)

0.68
(0.000)

0.65
(0.002)

0.26
(0.036)

0.46
(0.020)

0.34
(0.019)

ΔSalest-1

0.06
0.06
(0.051) (0.042)

0.06
0.05
(0.001) (0.001)

0.03
0.03
(0.028) (0.039)

Sizet-1

-0.04
-0.04
(0.105) (0.116)

-0.05 -0.04
(0.253) (0.298)

-0.07 -0.06
(0.028) (0.035)

ΔROAt-1

0.01
0.01
(0.845) (0.852)

-0.01 -0.01
(0.686) (0.698)

0.01
0.01
(0.549) (0.547)

ΔIndustry
Sales

0.07
0.02
(0.907) (0.975)

-1.51 -1.60
(0.138) (0.115)

-0.42 -0.46
(0.552) (0.505)

ΔEMPLt-1

0.22
0.20
(0.015) (0.028)

ΔCAPEt-1

0.09
0.07
(0.031) (0.070)

ΔPPEt-1

0.34
0.33
(0.000) (0.000)

ΔIndustry
EMPL

0.34
0.24
(0.552) (0.670)

ΔIndustry
CAPE

1.06
1.02
(0.008) (0.011)

ΔIndustry
PPE
N
Adj. R sq.

0.52
0.46
(0.257) (0.306)
389
0.02

328
0.04

328
0.06

416
0.03

328
0.07

34

328
0.15

376
0.03

367
0.17

367
0.26

After controlling for factors that drive normal hiring and investments, our findings
indicate that these BOTHs’ desire to pool with successful firms in the minds of investors
leads to excessive hiring and investments, similar to the interpretations of Kedia and
Philippon (2009) in the context of restatements. Our results support the idea that
excessive hiring and investments are part of a more complex scheme than previously
documented—schemes that includes forward stock splits, accruals management, and real
activities management.
4.2. The incentives: Executives’ compensation and stock trading gains
In this section, we test whether BOTHs’ corporate actions to temporarily boost their
stock prices have the ulterior motive of increasing their executives’ compensation and
allowing the sale of a significant proportion of their ownership at inflated prices around
the time of the forward split year.
4.2.1. Executive compensation incentives
As discussed previously and examined in the Appendix, the executives in charge of
BOTHs reap compensation gains from the signaling effects of forward splits while the
costs are borne by the long-term shareholders and future managers. If current managers
engage in financial misrepresentation to justify higher compensations, we should observe
the BOTHs as having abnormally high executive compensation around the initial forward
split.
Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), we measure the change in executive
compensation in three ways. ExecuComp provides two measures of total direct
compensation (TDC). TDC1 is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts, the
dollar value of stock grants and stock option grants, and other compensation. TDC2 is the
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sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts, net value of stock options exercised,
and other compensation. TDC2 can be enhanced more rapidly if stock splits temporarily
increase stock prices above the strike price of exercisable options. The third measure is
ΔSalary, which is the change in executives’ salaries. We test the possibility that besides
equity-based compensation increases managers could use firms’ artificial growth to
negotiate higher salaries similar to what happened with Doral. .
Table 7 reports changes in executives’ compensation for BOTHs and control firms in
the potentially manipulative years that include the year of the forward stock split and two
years before the split when we find evidence of multiple manipulative tactics.
Table 7 shows that BOTHs’ executives receive compensation hikes that not only are
higher than the average of 10% for other firms (Frydman and Jenter, 2010), but are much
higher than those for FORWARDs and FORWARD_NEGs control sample firms. Top
executives’ salaries increase by a mean of only 11% for the control firms in the year of
the forward splits (t = 0 ΔSalary column in Table 7), which is significantly lower than the
mean salary increase of 32% for BOTHs. BOTHs’ executives’ mean total compensation
increases dramatically by 188% in the initial forward split year as shown in the last
column of the top row Table 7, Panel B. 19 BOTHs’ increases are significantly higher
than the mean increase in the total direct compensation for control firms in the
corresponding year.

19

An increase of 187% in the total direct compensation is strikingly high for average
firms, but for split firms among which some have stock prices that double and triple during the
split year, this high increase reflects the increase in the value of managers’ holdings of stock
options. BOTHs’ executives’ median total compensation increases is somewhat lower at 64%, but
still strikingly above that of control firms.
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Table 7. Executives’ compensation and insiders’ stock ownership
For BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs for the split year (t = 0) and the two
previous years (t = -1 and t = -2), we compare mean values for ΔSalary (Panel A), change in
compensation (Panel B), and change in insiders’ ownership (ΔOwnership) (Panel C). We use
two measures of change in compensation—TDC1, which is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term
incentive payouts, the dollar value of stock grants and stock option grants, and other
compensation, and TDC2, which is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts, net
value of stock options exercised, and other compensation. Both measures of compensation are
summed for the top five executives listed in the firms’ proxy statements. Following John and
Lang (1991), we define insiders’ ownership (Ownership) as the percentage of shares owned by
executives, directors and other top executives. BOTHs minus FORWARDs and BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs is the difference in means. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. We report p-values (in parentheses) for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of
means (using t tests).
N

t = -2

t = -1

t=0

34%
18%
23%
15%
( 0.031)
11%
( 0.468)

32%
11%
11%
21%
( 0.009)
21%
( 0.006)

Panel A. Change in salary
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs

70
58
59

BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

38%
22%
15%
15%
( 0.148)
22%
( 0.013)

Panel B. Change in total compensation including salary, bonus and equity based compensation

BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs

70
58
59

BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

ΔTDC1
81%
89%
73%
-8%
( 0.816)
8%
( 0.803)

ΔTDC2 ΔTDC1
95%
140%
125%
115%
75%
110%
-30%
24%
(0.547)
(0.570)
19%
29%
( 0.432) ( 0.535)

ΔTDC2
188%
120%
108%
67%
(0.158)
79%
( 0.103)

ΔTDC1
188%
52%
43%
136%
( 0.026)
144%
( 0.013)

ΔTDC2
187%
85%
82%
101%
(0.030)
104%
( 0.024)

Panel C. Change in insiders’ ownership (ΔOwnership)

BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs

BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

N

t = -2

t = -1

t=0

105
70
113

5%
23%
57%
-18%
(0.277)
-51%
(0.366)

-8%
-0%
-6%
-8%
( 0.206)
-2%
( 0.880)

-15%
8%
4%
-24%
(0.018)
-19%
(0.002)
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Against the null hypothesis that the increases in BOTHs’ executive compensations are
legitimate increases due to exceptionally good performance during split years, our
alternative hypothesis is that these enormous compensation increases are based on
complex chicanery. To formally distinguish between these two alternatives, we control
for several variables following Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hartzell and Starks (2003)
by estimating the following regression:
∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ′ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ +
𝛽3 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽7 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 +
𝛽8 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 ∆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 ∆𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 + ∑2011
(9)
𝑦=1980 𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜀
where ∆𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝 is the percentage change in executives’ compensation measured by
salaries for models 1 and 2 and total direct compensation for models 3 and 4 in Table 8.
BOTHdummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for BOTHs and 0 for
FORWARDs. ∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ′ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ is computed as the percentage change in stock
price in the one year period that ends 10 days before the stock split’s effective date.
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 is the beginning-of-the-split-year’s ratio of the stock price to book value. Size is
the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debts to
TA. Dual is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO and chairman are
the same individual, and 0 otherwise. ∆ROA is the percentage change in return on assets.
∆Sales is the percentage change in net sales. ∆CAPE is the percentage change in capital
expenditures, and ∆ZSCO is the percentage change in the z-score. Regression results
presented in Table 8 are consistent with the univariate t-tests. Executives of BOTHs
receive statistically and economically significant increases in their compensations during
the split year.
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Table 8. Determinant of changes in executives’ compensation, and insider ownership
ΔSalary is the percentage change in executives’ salaries; ΔTDC1 is percentage change in
executives’ total direct compensations, and ΔOwnership is the percentage change in insiders’
ownership during split year. For a combined sample of BOTHs and FORWARDs, we regress
each of these four variables for year t, in turn, against the following set of independent
variables: BOTHdummy, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is a BOTH and
the value of 0 if the firm is a FORWARD; ∆Shareholders' Wealth, the percentage change in
stock price in the one year period ends 10 days before stock split effective day; MTBV, the
beginning of split year’s ratio of the stock price to book value; Size, the natural logarithm of
market capitalization; Leverage, the ratio of long term debts to TA; Dividends, the ratio of
dividend yield to operating income; Ownership, the percentage of shares owned by executives,
directors and other top executives; 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙, an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the
CEO position and chairman position are held by the same person and 0 otherwise; ΔROA, the
percentage change in return on assets; ΔSales, the percentage change in net sales; ΔCAPE, the
percentage change in capital expenditures; and ΔZSCO, the change in the firm’s Z-score. We
denote the year of the split as t and the previous year as t-1. Variables are trimmed at the 1st
and 99th percentiles. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-values are provided
in parentheses. Coefficients of all models are estimated with a time fixed effects.
ΔSalary%

Intercept
BOTHdummy

(1)
0.11
(0.072)
0.21
(0.009)

∆Shareholders'
Wealtht-1
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑡−1
Sizet-1
Leveraget-1

(2)
0.18
(0.149)
0.13
(0.044)
1.01
(0.697)
-0.00
(0.615)
-0.02
(0.209)
0.17
(0.499)

ΔTDC1%

(3)
0.49
(0.309)
1.39
(0.021)

(4)
1.97
(0.002)
0.99
(0.002)
0.09
(0.213)
0.02
(0.137)
-0.19
(0.020)
-0.79
(0.555)

ΔOwnership%

(5)
0.08
( 0.323)
-0.24
(0.017)

(6)
-0.14
(0.694)
-0.40
(0.031)
0.02
(0.631)
-0.01
(0.128)
-0.01
(0.742)
0.26
(0.735)
8.02
(0.735)
2.08
(0.000)
0.12
(0.455)
0.03
(0.624)
0.23
(0.154)
-0.02
(0.839)
-0.01
(0.863)

151
0.04

52
0.44

𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑡−1
𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙

-0.06
(0.310)
-0.05
(0.000)
0.12
(0.025)
-0.00
(0.950)
0.02
(0.269)

ΔROAt-1
ΔSalest-1
ΔCAPEt-1
ΔZSCOt-1
N
Adj. R sq.

120
0.05

73
0.39

-0.35
(0.263)
-0.14
(0.015)
-0.59
(0.038)
-0.10
(0.278)
-0.19
(0.065)
118
0.04

39

73
0.38

We argue that such increases are excessive as they are not supported by increases in
reported earnings, sales, or capital investments.
Our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2a that BOTHs’ managers receive
abnormally high compensations during the manipulation years identified by the initial
forward split. When this compensation is not induced by sustainable increases in firm
value, they can be considered as expropriations of shareholders by top management. Firm
value rapidly deteriorates when the complex financial chicanery is uncovered, but the
value destruction does not enter the utility function of the executives who sell their stock
holdings or depart the firm by then.
4.2.2. Capital gains incentives
In this section, we examine changes in stock ownership. If BOTHs’ insiders reduce
their stock ownership despite signaling favorable information to the market, then this
inconsistency would indicate the manipulative nature of the forward splits, supporting
Hypothesis 2b. Table 7, Panel C, reports changes in insiders’ ownership prior to and
during the forward split years. 20 As expected for genuine stock split firms, during the
stock split year FORWARDs and FORWARD_NEGs insiders increase their average
stock ownership by 8% and 4% (see the last column of Table 7, Panel C), respectively,
supporting the view that their forward splits are based on fundamental improvements in
the firms’ prospects. In the corresponding year, BOTH insiders reduce their average stock
ownership by 15%, supporting the view that BOTHs’ managers are not excited about
their firms’ future prospects. A reduction in stock ownership is clearly inconsistent with a
favorable signal that a forward split is purported to convey. This result also rules out

20

Insiders have an incentive to wait to sell their stock as long as its price is rising. Hence,
insider selling is likely to take place at a time close to the stock split.
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many other alternative explanations such as over optimism and incorrect market timing as
reasons for BOTHs’ forward split. Rather, as suggested in Hypothesis 2b, managers of
these firms have more likely conducted a forward split concurrently with a range of
strategic tactics to artificially boost their compensation and the short-term value of their
private interests at the expense of long-term shareholders.
We formally test the above conjecture by following the methodology of Jensen,
Solberg, and Zorn (1992) by estimating the following OLS regression:
∆𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 ∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 ′ 𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 +
𝛽3 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑂𝑡−1 +
𝛽8 𝐷𝑢𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽9 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝛽11 ∆𝐶𝐴𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛽12 ∆𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑡−1 +
∑2011
(10)
𝑦=1980 𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜀
where ∆𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑝 is the percentage change in insiders’ ownership. Dividends is the
ratio of dividend yield to operating income. Ownership is the percentage of insiders’
ownership at the beginning of the stock split year. Other variables are the same as defined
previously. Regression results presented in Table 8 confirm that the change in BOTHs’
insiders’ ownership is 24% lower than the change in FORWARDs’ insiders’ ownership
during the split year. The difference is even more economically significant with BOTHs’
ownership changes 40% below peer firms after controlling for firm growth and other
control variables that might affect insiders’ decisions to change their stock ownership.
Instead of adding to their positions around the supposedly positive forward split signal,
BOTHs’ executives reduce their stock ownership.
4.2.3. Chicanery and CEO turnover
CEO turnover is another potential indication of financial chicanery. On the one hand,
having taken advantage of the short-term benefits of chicanery and exposing the BOTH
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firm to excessive risks and a declining future, the CEO might want to move on. On the
other hand, the board of directors of BOTHs could fire the CEOs and managers who
engage in aggressive earnings management (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata, 2012). In
either case, chicanery is expected to increase the likelihood and speed of CEO turnover.
Table 9 compares the CEO turnover percentages and turnover speed for BOTHs and
control firms. We report the mean number of years before a CEO change following the
stock split year. BOTHs change CEOs within 5 years after the forward split whereas the
control firm CEOs stay significantly longer, averaging more than 7 years. To make sure
that this difference is not due to a difference in average CEO age among our control and
sample firms, we report average CEO age for BOTHs, FORWARDs and
FORWARD_NEGs at the end of forward split year. If BOTHs’ CEOs are older than
matched peer firms’ CEOs, they would leave offices sooner even without any wrong
doing. But, in fact, BOTHs’ CEOs are younger and have an average age of 51.2 years
old, which is not statistically different from the average age of CEOs for FORWARDs
(FORWARD_NEGs), which is 52 (53) years who are slightly older. Table 9 also shows
that 33% of BOTHs change their CEOs within two years after the split event. In contrast,
only 17% (10%) of FORWARDs (FORWARD_NEGs) change their CEOs within the
same time interval. We find that 26% (34%) of FORWARD (FORWARD_NEG) control
firms whose CEO conducts a forward split still have the same CEO in December 2012 as
compared to only 15% of BOTHs. Our results (not presented here) show that 71% of
BOTHs change their CEOs before conducting their reverse splits. In our multivariate
analysis, we control for several variables following Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata (2012)
and Kaplan and Minton (2012) to rule out alternative explanations of CEO turnover.
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Table 9. Statistics related to CEO turnover following stock splits
For BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs, we report the means for variables related
to CEO turnover following stock splits. CEO Age is the age of the CEO at the end of the split
year. Years-to-Turnover is the number of years between the forward split and the CEO
turnover. Within 2 years is the percentage of firms that change their CEO within 2 years after
the forward split. Within 5 years is the percentage of firms that change their CEO within 5
years after the forward split. No Turnover is the percentage of firms that still have the same
CEO as of January 2013. CEO turnover statistics are calculated for BOTHs, FORWARDs and
FORWARD_NEGs. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We report p-values
for the test of the null hypothesis that the means (using a t test).
CEO turnover; No./%
CEO
Years-toWithin 2
Within 5
No
Sample
Age
Turnover
years
years Turnover
Post-split CEO turnover
BOTHs
165
51.2
5.0
55 (33%) 108(65%) 25(15%)
FORWARDs

110

52.5

7.8

19 (17%)

48(43%) 29(26%)

FORWARD_NEGs

154

53.1

7.4

15 (10%)

68(44%)

53(34)

-1.3
(0.376)
-1.9
(0.138)

-2.8
(0.000)
-2.3
(0.000)

16%
(0.003)
23%
(0.000)

22%
(0.000)
21%
(0.000)

-11%
(0.021)
-19%
(0.000)

BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

We estimate the following OLS and Logit regressions, in turn:

𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠_𝑇𝑜_𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 =
∝ + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽5 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉
2011

+ 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + ∑

𝑦=1980

+ 𝜀

𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦

𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝑜𝑢𝑡_2𝑦 = ∝ + 𝛽1 𝐵𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 + 𝛽3 ∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽4 ∆𝑅𝑂𝐴
+ 𝛽5 𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑉 + 𝛽6 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝑅𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
∑2011
𝑦=1980 𝛽𝑦 𝑇𝐷𝑦 + 𝜀

(11)

(12)

where Years_to_Turnover is the number of years between the initial forward split and the
CEO turnover. BOTHdummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for BOTHs
and 0 for FORWARDs. BHAR is the 1 year post split buy and hold abnormal return.
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ΔSales is the one-year post-split sales growth. ΔROA is the one-year post-split operating
performance growth measured as the growth of ROA. MTBV is the ratio of the one-year
post-split stock price divided by the end of the year book value. Size is the one-year postsplit natural logarithm of market capitalization. IndustryRet is the twelve-month post-split
Fama and French (1997) cumulative returns for particular industry to which the BOTH
firm belongs. 21 Leverage is the one-year post-split ratio of long term debts to firm’s TA.
CEO-out-2y is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO changes within two
years after the forward split. Kaplan and Minton (2012) argue that CEO turnover have
become more frequent over the years. To control for this trend we estimate our regression
with time fixed effect estimators, 𝑇𝐷s.
Table 10 reports the results of two regressions. OLS results show that BOTHdummy
significantly enhances the regression’s explanatory power, and R-squared increases
almost three fold to 17 percent. The negative coefficient of -3.84 for BOTHdummy in the
OLS regression shows that the BOTH CEOs have significantly shorter tenure than
control firms. Firms with higher post-split abnormal returns, BHAR, and larger Size keep
their manager for a longer time after their split year. Firm specific return, performance
and sales growth, M/B ratio, firm size, and industry returns explain only 6% of variation
in CEO’s tenure after conducting the forward splits. The Logit model confirms our OLS
results. BOTHs are much more likely to change their CEO within a very short period of
two years after the initial split. This likelihood is not fully explained by the variables we
use based on the prior literature.

21

Returns for 48 Fama and French (1997) industries are acquired from French website
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Table 10. Determinants of CEO turnover
We present the results of the OLS regressions (columns 1-3) and the Logit analysis (columns
4-6) of the determinants of the quickness of CEO turnover. Our first proxy for CEO-turnover
speed is Years-to-Turnover, which is the number of years between the initial forward split and
the CEO turnover. Our second proxy for CEO-turnover speed is CEO-out-2yr, which is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO left the company within two years after the forward
split and 0 otherwise. BOTHdummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 for BOTHs and 0 for
FORWARDs. All of the following variables are the one-year-post-split values except the
industry return which is the cumulative 12 month return. BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal
return. ΔSales is the sales growth. ΔROA is operating performance growth measured as the
growth of ROA. MTBV is the ratio of post-split, stock price divided by the end of year book
value. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. IndustryRet is the 12 month postsplit Fama and French 48 SIC classification industry cumulative returns. Leverage is the ratio
of long term debt to TA. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. P-values are
provided in parentheses. Coefficients of all models are estimated with time fixed effects.
Years-to-Turnover
CEO-out-2yr Logit Analysis
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Intercept

7.87
(0.000)
-2.80
(0.000)

8.83
(0.000)

11.21
(0.000)

-1.56
(0.000)
0.87
(0.004)

-1.06
(0.000)

-2.13
(0.002)

BOTHdummy

-3.84
(0.000)

1.54
(0.001)

BHAR

0.25
(0.049)

-0.02
(0.981)

-0.37
(0.375)

0.10
(0.765)

ΔSales

-1.02
(0.071)

-0.81
(0.128)

0.27
(0.265)

0.21
(0.404)

ΔROA

-0.01
(0.407)

-0.01
(0.551)

-0.001
(0.788)

-0.01
(0.664)

MTBV

-0.001
(0.915)

-0.02
(0.052)

0.001
(0.768)

0.01*
(0.067)

Size

-0.32
(0.049)

-0.34
(0.028)

-0.004
(0.968)

0.01
(0.958)

IndustryRet

1.52
(0.172)

1.062
(0.314)

-1.02
(0.139)

-0.99
(0.066)

Leverage

-0.79
(0.648)

-0.24
(0.884)

0.28
(0.752)

0.19
(0.832)

194
0.06

194
0.17

275

194

194

155

116

109

N
Adj. R sq.
-Log
Likelihood

275
0.07
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CEO departure may reflect an element of CEO opportunism or Board of Director
punishment for manipulative behavior, but in any case higher CEO turnover indicates the
presence of problems at BOTHs. We argue that managers’ participation in earnings
management and real activities management to boost personal compensations, explain, at
least partially, the quick turnover of the BOTHs’ CEOs.
4.2.4. Robustness test: Alternative control samples and subsamples.
Although we have shown evidence consistent with accruals management, real
activities management, and excessive executive compensation for BOTHs, we perform
additional robustness tests to confirm that financial chicanery is the most likely
explanation of our results.
For our first robustness test we are concerned that our results are driven by misfortune
or normal business risk. To address this concern we compare BOTHs with the third
control sample of reverse splitters only (REVERSEs). REVERSEs do not conduct a
forward split preceding a reverse split whereas BOTHs do. We compare the accruals and
real activities of matched REVERSEs during the potentially manipulative period
identified by the forward-split year of the BOTHs. We investigate the ten year prereverse split period for the REVERSEs to determine if there is any evidence of potential
aggressive accrual management and real activities management against the alternative
hypothesis of mere misfortune. If BOTHs’ reverse splits simply represent misfortunes or
business risks, we should not find any evidence of excessive accruals management or real
activities management for BOTHs relative to REVERSEs.
Table 11, Panel B, shows that REVERSEs do not have abnormally high Discretionary
Accruals or abnormal ΔEMPL and ΔPP&E. REVERSEs have almost 0% Discretionary
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Accruals while BOTHs have significantly higher Discretionary Accruals of 0.34%.22
REVERSEs have only 14% mean increase in ΔEMPL during the same year during which
BOTHs experience a 53% mean increase. REVERSEs also have only 35% mean increase
in ΔPP&E as compared to a 98% mean increase by BOTHs. Finally, REVERSEs’
managers have 16% growth in their mean total compensation measured by TDC2 while
BOTHs’ managers have a 187% mean increase. Hence, our evidence supports our
chicanery explanation described earlier rather than a misfortune explanation.
Turning to another set of robustness tests, we investigate the alternative hypothesis that
our results are driven by the dot com bubble and the subsequent financial crisis. A related
concern is that the increased number of BOTHs in recent years is due to relaxed listing
requirements, so the BOTH treatment sample consists of risky rather than manipulative
firms. In this robustness test we rule out each of these alternative explanations in two
different ways. In our first test, which we report in Table 11, Panel C, we eliminate post1997 years because even managers with no manipulative intentions can get caught in a
bubble and bust of that magnitude. Results for this subsample in Table 11, Panel C, are
similar to those for all BOTHs in Table 11, Panel A.
In our second test, which we report in Table 11, Panel D, we eliminate all computers
and telecommunications firms from our sample. Our analysis confirms that the results are
not driven by once-overvalued, dot-com firms because results in Table 11, Panel D, are
similar to those in Table 11, Panel A.

22

We discuss the differences in means throughout the paper but the conclusions for all
hypotheses are the same when we test the differences in medians.
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Table 11. Robustness tests
We provide means and medians for control samples useful in our robustness tests. Panel A repeats statistics (reported previously on tables 2,5 and
7) for our treatment sample of BOTHs. Panel B reports new statistics for REVERSEs, which are firms that conduct a reverse split without being
preceded by an initial forward split within 10 years. Statistics are reported for the same year of the associated matched BOTH. Panel C reports
statistics for BOTHs, excluding all cases that conduct forward splits after 1997. Panel D reports statistics for BOTHs excluding all firms belonging
to the computer or telecommunications industries. Panel E reports statistics for BOTHs that conduct the follow up reverse split more than 2 years
after the initial forward split. Disc. Accruals is the residual from the model in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), which modifies Jones (1991).
ΔEMPL is the change in the number of employees during the forward split year. ΔPPE is the growth in plant, property and equipment during the
forward split year. ΔCAPE is the growth in capital expenditures during the forward split year. ΔTDC is the growth in executive compensation
during the forward split year. BHAR is the 1-year, post-split buy and hold abnormal returns. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
Sample
N
Disc. accruals
ΔEMPL
ΔPP&E
ΔCAPE
ΔTDC1
ΔTDC2
Panel A. BOTHs (Treatment sample)
BOTHs
251 Mean
0.34
53%
98%
130%
188%
187%
Median
0.36
17%
36%
47%
36%
64%
Panel B. Matched control sample of REVERSEs
REVERSEs
251 Mean
-0.00
14%
35%
-53%
18%
16%
Median
0.00
01%
2%
-84%
-13%
4%
Panel C. Pre dot.com bubble BOTHs
BOTH pre151 Mean
0.34
61%
90%
114%
204%
180%
1997
Median
0.24
14%
36%
50%
32%
67%
Panel D. BOTHs excluding all computer and telecommunication firms
BOTH (non-dot 182 Mean
0.37
66%
116%
139%
200%
197%
com)
Median
0.34
17%
36%
47%
35%
70%
Panel E. BOTHs with a long gap of >2 years between forward and reverse split
BOTH long
218 Mean
0.40
60%
118%
114%
326%
192%
Median
0.25
18%
37%
44%
50%
67%
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In our final robustness test, which we report in Table 11, Panel E, we rule out the
possibility that our results are driven by a few extreme cases of firms conducting follow
up reverse splits shortly after initial forward split. Results for the BOTH subsample
eliminating firms with very short gaps between the initial forward split and the ultimate
reverse split in Table 11, Panel E, are similar to those reported for all BOTHs in Table
11, Panel A.
4.3. The aftermath of the chicanery
We address whether BOTHs experience post-split ROA declines, and shed employees
and capital, soon after their forward splits (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a,b; and
Shivakumar, 2000). We recognize that BOTHs are expected to report declining
performance in the long run and around their reverse splits almost by definition. But their
performance around the forward split should be positive if forward split were genuinely
signaling favorable fundamental information. In other words, as stated in the discussion
of Hypothesis 3, if BOTHs’ forward split is based on genuine favorable reported
earnings, they should not be associated with immediate poor future performance. In
contrast, if BOTHs’ forward splits are part of complex chicanery, any artificial increase
in operating and reported performance will adversely affect future reported and operating
performance immediately after their forward split.
4.3.1. Reversal of operating performance
ROAs for the pre- and post-split windows for BOTHs and FORWARDs are shown
graphically in the Figure 3. The 90% confidence intervals of ROA show that that when
BOTHs mimic FORWARDs’ ROAs through accruals management and real activities
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management, their strategy is very harmful to long term shareholders. The reversal of
earnings management results in much lower future ROAs soon after their forward split.

10

Operating performance (ROA)

8
6

BFR
FORWARDs
FO

4
2
0

-2

-1

0

1

-2

2

BOTHs

%

-4
-6

Years relative to split year (Year “0”)
Figure 3.
Operating performance before and after initial forward stock splits
Operating performance is the median ROA over the years -2 to +2 where year 0 is the split year.
The upper bans are 95% confidence intervals around the operating performance of FORWARDs,
firms with only forward splits. The lower bans are 95% confidence intervals around the operating
performance of BOTHs, firms with both a forward split and a reverse split within the subsequent
10 years.

Table 12 formally tests the statistical significance of the sharp decline in average ROA
experienced by BOTHs. ROA of BOTHs dropped to an average of -19% in the first year
following the split year. Control sample firms, on the other hand, continue their pre-split
positive ROAs during the post-split window, which confirms the reliability of their presplit earnings and financial reporting.
4.3.2. Reversal of growth in employee strength and capital investments
Kedia and Philippon (2009) show that manipulative firms correct for past manipulation
by shedding employees and capital. To test this idea in the context of BOTHs, we calculate
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Table 12
Operating performance and hiring and investment
We present the post-split sharp decline for BOTHs. In Panel A, we report means of operating
performance around forward stock splits for BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs.
Operating performance is reported for three consecutive years starting at t = 0 (split year). We
define ROA as operating income divided by cash-adjusted total assets. Panel A reports
operating performance. Panel B reports mean ΔEMPL, ΔPPE, and ΔCAPE for BOTHs,
FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs. Growth rates are calculated over two non-overlapping
periods—the two year post-forward split window and 3-4 years post-split window. Variables
are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We report p-values (in parenthesis) of the test of the
null hypothesis of equality of means (using a t test).
N
t=0
t=1
t=2
Panel A. Operating performance (ROA)
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

231
211
211

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

-0.4%
5.9%
5.8%
-6.4%
(0.000)
-6.3%
(0.000)

-19.0%
4.5%
2.7%
-23.7
(0.000)
-22%
(0.000)

-16.0%
2.8%
2.6%
-19.3%
(0.000)
-19.1%
(0.000)

Panel B. Post-split hiring and investment
0-2 years after split
N ΔEMPL ΔPPE ΔCAPE
BOTHs
202
4%
22%
-8%
FORWARDs
180
25%
82%
64%
FORWARD_NEGs
170
12%
31%
44%
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
-21%
-60%
-56%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BOTHs minus
-7%
-9%
-52%
FORWARD_NEGs
(0.114) (0.222) (0.011)
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3-4 years after split
ΔEMPL ΔPPE ΔCAPE
-5%
-10%
4%
20%
33%
29%
18%
23%
53%
-25%
-42%
-24%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.041)
-23%
-33%
-48%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

the growth rate of labor and investment over the consecutive two-year windows
following the forward splits for both treatment and control firms.
Results reported in Table 12, Panel B, lend further support the conjecture that BOTHs
are manipulative. BOTHs that suspiciously expand during the pre-forward split period
start shrinking in the post-split period subsequent to the complex chicanery. During the
post-split period, especially in two to four years after the forward split, BOTHs reduce
their number of employees by around 5% while control firms continue to increase
employee strength. Subsequent to the complex chicanery, BOTHs reduce their capital
expenditures on PPE by 18% and their total PPE by 13%. While BOTHs shed labor and
capital, peer firms in the control samples continue to grow, hire, and invest. This dramatic
reversal questions the reliability of BOTHs’ pre-split financial reports and the very basis
of the forward split signal.
5. Conclusions
We find that hundreds of firms use financial tactics to temporarily paint a rosy picture
about their performance. These misrepresentations are more complex than previously
documented in the accounting and finance literature. We show that these schemes often
involve accruals management, real activities management through excessive asset growth
and hiring, all coupled with deceptive forward stock splits. The forward split typically
signals a bright future for the firm, but it can be used as a false signal by manipulative
firms to influence investors’ perceptions about earnings sustainability. Our results show
that executives involved in such complex chicanery reward themselves with significant
increases in executive compensation. Managers and other insiders also reduce their
average stock ownership sharply in the forward split year instead of acquiring an
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additional stake like an optimistic manager would do. Although these misrepresentations
are used to increase executives’ compensation and boost insiders’ trading profits, they
cost the firm’s other stakeholders dearly. Those stakeholders suffer through the strategy’s
adverse consequences such as layoffs and asset sales, declining operating performance,
and reverse stock splits.
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Appendix A: Model development.
We extend the Kedia and Philippon (2009) framework to show how executive
compensation and executives’ tenure plans can stimulate complex financial chicanery.
Our innovations include the addition of managers’ ability to use stock splits to
manipulate investors’ perceptions about the sustainability (S) of earnings power when
reported earning is itself based on accruals managements (A) and real activities
management (R).1
The model has two periods, t = 1 and 2. The market contains a large number of firms
whose true earnings power is 𝐸𝑡 . 𝐸𝑡 depends on each firm’s true productivity, θ, true
earnings sustainability, 𝑞𝑡 , and the amount of labor hired, 𝑛𝑡 . Both 𝜃 and 𝑞𝑡 are the same
in the two periods and observed by managers, but not by investors. We follow Kedia and
Philippon in using a Leontief production function and assume that labor is the only factor
of production, supplied at price w < 1. True earnings power is given by 𝐸𝑡 =
min( 𝑛𝑡 , 𝜃 + 𝑞) − 𝑤𝑛𝑡 .

Half of the firms have a low earning power 𝜃 + 𝑞 = 𝜃𝐿 + 𝑞 𝐿 and half a high earnings
power,
𝜃+q = 𝜃𝐻 + 𝑞 𝐻 ,

(1)

with 𝜃𝐻 + 𝑞 𝐻 > 𝜃𝐿 + 𝑞 𝐿 > 0.
The first best level of employment is n* (𝐸) = 𝐸; and the first best true earnings power is
E*(𝜃, 𝑞) = (𝜃 + 𝑞) (1 - w).

1

See Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996), McNichols and Dravid (1990), Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman
(1984), and Kedia and Philippon (2009).
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Current profitability affects how many employees to hire optimally and earnings
sustainability affects the percentage of fulltime employees to total hires and also the
length of employees’ contracts, retention policies etc.
To form their perception, Z1, about earnings power, investors observe only
employment, 𝑛, reported earnings, 𝑦𝑡 , which are equal to true profits plus discretionary
accruals, 𝐴𝑡 plus earnings improvements using real activities management 𝑅𝑡 . Investors
also use a high value of the split signal in period 1, S 1, to form positive expectations
about firms earnings sustainability. The risk-free rate is normalized to 0, and accruals and
real activities management always have a zero net present value. Hence,
𝑍1 = 𝐸1 + 𝐴 + 𝑅 + 𝑆1

and

𝑍2 = 𝐸2 − 𝐴 − 𝑅 − 𝑆2

(2)

-A, -R, and -𝑆2 in this context are the opposite signal investors infer or receive in period 2
about firms’ earnings sustainability when a firm with false period 1 forward split signal
reverse their previously inflated report earning, shrink real activity, and conduct reverse
split in period 2. We assume that the effects of a forward stock split and a reverse stock
split on perceived earnings sustainability are of equal magnitudes, but in opposite
directions. In that sense 𝑆2 equals −𝑆1 .
Equilibrium
When they have bad news, low earnings power firms’ managers might have incentives
to hide this fact by managing reported earnings and provide false signals about earnings
sustainability. Let 𝜆 be the fraction of managers of low earnings power firms who
manipulate (strategy m) and 1 - 𝜆 the fraction who report honestly (strategy h). Let 𝜆̂ be
the market belief about 𝜆. Since n is observable, manipulative firms must hire just like
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good sustainable ones, therefore 𝑛𝑚 = 𝜃 𝐻 + 𝑞 𝐻 . As a result, the associated true earnings
power of the manipulative strategy m is:
𝐸 𝑚 = (𝜃 𝐿 + 𝑞 𝐿 ) − (𝜃 𝐻 + 𝑞 𝐻 )𝑊.

(3)

Note that 𝐸 𝑚 < 𝐸 𝐿 because of the excessive hiring needed to mimic the earnings
power of good firms. Manipulations have to make up not only for the fundamental
difference in earnings power, which equals
𝐸𝐻∗ − 𝐸𝐿∗ = [(𝜃 𝐻 − 𝜃 𝐿 ) + (𝑞 𝐻 − 𝑞 𝐿 )](1 − 𝑊)

(4)

but also for the inefficient allocation of resources on excess hiring, which equals
𝐸𝐿∗ − 𝐸𝑚 = [(𝜃 𝐻 − 𝜃 𝐿 ) + (𝑞 𝐻 − 𝑞 𝐿 )]𝑊

(5)

𝐴 + 𝑅 + 𝑆 = [𝜃 𝐻 − 𝜃 𝐿 ] + [𝑞 𝐻 − 𝑞 𝐿 ]

(6)

As a result,

The amount of required manipulation is positively related to both the difference in
productivity and the difference in earnings sustainability between good and bad firms.
In efficient financial markets, the market value of a firm as a function of its perceived
earnings power, 𝑍1 , equals,
𝑉(𝑍1 , 𝜆̂ ) = 𝐸 [𝑍2 |𝑍1 , 𝜆̂] = {
𝑉𝐻 (𝜆̂) =

∗ ̂ ∗
𝐸𝐻
+ 𝜆 𝐸𝐿
̂
1+ 𝜆

𝑉𝐿 = 𝐸 ∗ (𝜃 𝐿 , 𝑞 𝐿 ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑍1 < 𝐸𝐿∗
}
𝑉𝐻 ( 𝜆̂ ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑍1 ≥ 𝐸𝐻∗
−

̂
𝜆
̂
1+ 𝜆

(𝐴 + 𝑅 + 𝑆)

(7)

The expected utilities of managers of unproductive firms under honest disclosure
“strategy h” and manipulating reports “strategy m” are
𝑈 ℎ = (𝛼1 + 𝐶 )𝑉𝐿 + (𝛼2 + 𝐶 )𝑉̂2
𝑈 𝑚 = (𝛼1 + 𝐶 )𝑉𝐻 ( 𝜆̂) + (𝛼2 + 𝐶 )(𝑉̂2 − [𝐴 + 𝑅 + 𝑆]) − 𝛾𝑇,𝐷
where, 𝛼 is the percentage of stocks owned by executives. C is the percentage of
executives’ compensation connected to firm value. A+R+S represent the gains in
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(8)

perceived earnings power in period 1 through manipulation and assumed to be equal to
the value loss in period 2. 𝛾 is managers’ perceived punishment. Managers’ perceived
punishment has both magnitude and timing aspects. T is manager’s tenure plans (number
of years a manager is planning to stay in the firm). D is the postpone duration (manager’s
belief about how long he/she can postpone price correction using stock splits). Managers
with less desire to stay with the firm and those who think they can postpone the
revelation of true earnings power by conducting forward splits are more likely to
manipulate their reported earnings power at period 1.
At equilibrium: 𝑈 ℎ = 𝑈 𝑚 . This leads to:
1 + λ̂
1 − w − λ̂

=

α1 + C
α1 + C
+ [(θH − θL ) + (qH − qL )]
α2 + C
γ

(9)

The fraction, 𝜆̂, of managers of unproductive firms who manipulate earnings increases
with the ratio of period 1 to period 2 executives’ wealth connectivity to firm
value[(𝛼1 + 𝐶)⁄(𝛼2 + 𝐶)]. So manipulation incentive increases if managers plan to
reduce their stock ownership in the firm and avoid the negative consequence of period 1
manipulation in period 2. 𝜆̂ also increases with the amount of stock ownership, 𝛼1 , by
managers at period 1, the percentage of executives compensation connected to firm value
“C”, the productivity difference between productive and unproductive firms (𝜃 𝐻 − 𝜃 𝐿 ),
and the earnings sustainability difference between productive and unproductive firms
(𝑞 𝐻 − 𝑞 𝐿 ). On the other hand 𝜆̂ decreases with the perceived cost of manipulation, γ.
Tenure plans and manipulation incentives
An important element in the above theoretical framework is that managers who plan to
stay with the firm longer until the second period do not have a strong incentive to
aggressively manipulate perceptions about their earnings power. On the other hand
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managers who plan to leave the firm sooner after the first period will have a strong
incentive to manage that perception.
In order for managers who are planning to stay and manipulate, utility of strategy m
should be strictly higher than utility of strategy h; i.e., 𝑈 𝑚 > 𝑈 ℎ which leads to:
(𝛼1 + 𝐶 )(𝑉𝐻 − 𝑉𝐿 ) − (𝛼2 + 𝐶 )(𝐴 + 𝑅 + 𝑆) − 𝛾 > 0
Substituting 𝜶𝟏 = 𝜶𝟐 , and 𝑉𝐻 − 𝑉𝐿 =

(𝛼2 +𝐶) (A+R+S)
(𝛼1 +𝐶)

(10)

+ (𝛼

𝛾

1 +𝐶)

,

the condition becomes:
(𝛼2 +𝐶) (A+R+S)

(𝛼1 + 𝐶 ) {[

(𝛼1 +𝐶)

+

𝛾
(𝛼1 +𝐶)

] − (𝐴 + 𝑅 + 𝑆)} > 𝛾

(11)

which reduces to 𝛾 > 𝛾.
Detailed derivation of this proof and equilibrium are available upon request. This
condition 𝛾 > 𝛾 is not possible. So, managers with intentions to stay do not manipulate.
On the other hand, a manager who plans to leave the firm after reaping rewards in period
1 (receiving higher compensations and selling the entire ownership at an inflated price,
and expecting 𝛼2 = 0 in any event), will have an incentive to manipulate and use strategy
m as long as:
(𝛼1 + 𝐶 )(𝑉𝐻 − 𝑉𝐿 ) > 𝛾

(12)

because period 2 terms drop out. 𝛾 in this context will represent claw back provisions and
penalties including any possible reputation loss if the firm got caught by regulatory
agencies. So, managers will manipulate earnings as long as their claw back provisions
and penalties are not significant enough to offset rewards reaped in period 1. This
conjecture is consistent with the findings of Chan, Chen, Chen, and Yu (2013). They
show that the incidence of accounting restatements declines when firms initiate claw back
provisions.
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Appendix B: Tests of medians.
This appendix contains variety of supplementary results and robustness tests related
to the material in the paper. In particular, in order to insure comparability Table A.1
reports median descriptive statistics for the treatment firms (BOTHs) and the control
firms (FORWARDs and FORWARD_NEGs). Table A.2 lends further support to the
accruals manipulation hypothesis through reporting median pre-split discretionary
accruals, operating performance, and restatements for treatment and control firms. In
order to explore the complexity of earnings management tools employed by the treatment
group, Table A.3 reports pre-split median abnormal cash flow as a measure of real
activities management. Table A.4 reports median growth of employees, PPE, and capital
expenditures as an indication of excessive growth shown by Kedia and Philippon (2009).
Table A.5 reports results for the intent (incentive) hypothesis at which we test managerial
incentives by reporting changes in executives’ compensation and insiders’ stock
ownership. Results for the aftermath hypotheses is presented on tables A.6 and A.7;
Table A.6 reports board punishment (CEO turnover) following stock splits, and Table
A.7 reports operational reversals in the form of post-split changes in Operating
performance, employment and investment.

59

Table A.1. Descriptive statistics
We report statistics for our treatment sample of firms that conduct both a forward split
and a subsequent reverse split within 10 years (BOTHs) and two matched control
samples—FORWARDs, firms that conduct only a forward split and no reverse split,
and FORWARD_NEGs, firms that conduct only a forward split and no reverse split
and also have negative returns over both the first three months and the first year
following the forward split. Panel A reports medians of our matching variables, the
pre-split price (in USD) and size (in million USD). Panel B reports medians of firm
characteristics for the three samples combined. Leverage is long term debt divided by
total assets. RDEX/TA is expenditures on research and development divided by total
assets. Sales Growth is the percentage change in net sales. MTBV is the market to book
value calculated as end of year stock price divided by book value per share. Current
Ratio is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Variables are trimmed at 1st and
99th percentiles. We designate the year of the split as t = 0. All of these variables are
for year t-1 except for Sales Growth, which is for t = 0.
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
(treatment)
(control1)
(control2)
Panel A. Matching variables on the effective date of the initial forward split (n = 251)
Price pre-split
28.9
31.8
23.2
129
Size pre-split
234
264
1.5
Splitting
2
2
factor
Panel B. Firm characteristics as of the year prior to the split year (n = 251)
Leverage
RDEX/TA
Sales Growth
MTBV
Current Ratio

0.08
0.04
0.10
4.1
2.3

0.8
0.04
0.09
4.2
2.1
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0.10
0.02
0.10
2.4
2.4

Table A.2. Pre-split discretionary accruals, operating performance, and restatements
Panel A reports Discretionary accruals for BOTHS, FORWARDS, FORWARD_NEGs and a
control group matched on sales growth and ROA following Collins, Pungaliya and Vijh
(2013). The medians of abnormal accruals are calculated as the residual from the model in
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), which modifies Jones (1991). Panel B reports Pre-split
operating performance (ROA). ROA is operating income divided by cash-adjusted total assets.
The columns in Panels A and B show the values of the variables relative to the split year. We
report p-values (in parenthesis) of the test of the null hypothesis of medians (using a Wilcoxon
test) for tested pairs.
N
t = -2
t = -1
t=0
Panel A. Discretionary accruals (medians)
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
Sales-growth/ROA matched
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

192
173
163
207

0.05
0.00
-0.02
-0.00
0.05
(0.3228)
0.07
(0.113)
0.05
(0.112)

BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus Sales-growth/ROA matched

0.39
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.38
(0.029)
0.36
(0.018)
0.38
(0.006)

0.36
0.01
0.07
-0.02
0.35
(0.000)
0.29
(0.000)
0.38
(0.000)

Panel B: Pre-split operating performance (ROA) (medians)
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

231
211
185

3.17%
5.84%
5.74%
-2.7%
(0.000)
-2.57%
(0.000)

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs
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3.87%
6.20%
6.37%
-2.5%
(0.000)
-2.5%
(0.000)

2.47%
6.40%
6.13%
-4.00%
(0.000)
-3.66
(0.000)

Table A.3. Pre-split abnormal cash flow
In Panel A, for the years t = -2 … 0, where 0 is the year of the forward split, for BOTHs,
FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs, we present the medians of abnormal cash flow
estimated as the residuals from Roychowdhury (2006) model. We test the null hypothesis of
equality of medians (using a Wilcoxon test) for pairs being tested. Variables are trimmed at the
1st and 99th percentiles. We report p-values (in parenthesis).
Panel A. Pre-split abnormal cash flow (𝜺𝒕 )
N
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

164
128
129

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

t = -2
0.05
0.11
0.09
-0.06
(0.092)
-0.04
(0.713)
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t = -1
0.02
0.10
0.09
-0.08
(0.000)
-0.07
(0.002)

t=0
0.11
0.13
0.10
-0.01
(0.366)
-0.00
(0.106)

Table A.4
Employees, PPE, and capital expenditures
For the years t = -2, -1, and 0, where 0 is the year of the forward split, we provide the medians
for the growth in the number of employees in Panel A, growth in property, plant and equipment
in Panel B, and growth in capital expenditure on property, plant and equipment in Panel C.
Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In each panel we compare the values of
the indicated variables for the BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs. We report p-values
(in parentheses) for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of median growth rates using a
Wilcoxon test.
N

t = -2

t = -1

t=0

Panel A. Growth in number of employees.
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

200
185
165

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

14%
13%
6%
1%
(0.175)
8%
(0.001)

19%
13%
12%
6%
(0.040)
7%
(0.015)

17%
13%
11%
4%
(0.036)
6%
(0.014)

Panel B. Growth in property, plant and equipment (PPE).
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

213
199
177

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

31%
16%
7%
14%
(0.013)
24%
(0.000)

30%
14%
12%
17%
(0.000)
18%
(0.000)

36%
19%
16%
18%
(0.000)
20%
(0.000)

Panel C. Growth in capital expenditure on PPE.
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

195
177
165

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

37%
12%
15%
24%
(0.110)
25%
(0.076)
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53%
24%
25%
30%
(0.007)
29%
(0.004)

47%
26%
35%
20%
(0.027)
12%
(0.056)

Table A.5
Executives’ compensation and insiders’ stock ownership
For BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs for the split year (t =0) and the two
previous years (t = -1 and t = -2), we compare median values for ΔSalary (Panel A),
compensation (Panel B), and insiders’ ownership (ΔOwnership) (Panel C). We use two
measures of change in compensation—TDC1, which is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term
incentive payouts, the dollar value of stock grants and stock option grants, and other
compensation, and TDC2, which is the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive payouts, net
value of stock options exercised, and other compensation. Both measures of compensation are
summed for the top five executives listed in the firms’ proxy statements. Following John and
Lang (1991) we define insiders’ ownership as the percentage of shares owned by executives,
directors and other top executives. BOTHs minus FORWARDs (FORWARDS_NEGs) is the
difference in medians, in turn, for these two samples. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th
percentiles. We report p-values (in parentheses) for tests of the null hypothesis of equality of
medians using Wilcoxon tests.
N

t = -2

t = -1

t=0

ΔSalary
20%
13%
4%
7%
(0.000)
16%
(0.000)

ΔSalary
17%
6%
6%
12%
(0.002)
11%
(0.011)

Panel A. Salary and bonus

BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs

70
58
59

BOTHs minus
FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

ΔSalary
23%
11%
13%
12%
(0.005)
10%
(0.013)
Panel B. Compensation

BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs

70
58
59

BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

ΔTDC1

ΔTDC2

ΔTDC1

ΔTDC2

ΔTDC1

ΔTDC2

22%
34%
26%
-12%
(0.985)

43%
40%
22%
-2%
(0.300)

37%
48%
45%
-11%
( 0.418)

94%
55%
35%
39%
(0.145)

36%
14%
14%
22%
(0.007)

-4%
(0.861)

21%
(0.133)

-8%
(0.034)

59%
(0.075)

22%
(0.010)

64%
34%
34%
30%
(0.005)
30%
(0.005)

Panel C. Insiders’ ownership ( ΔOwnership)
N
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs

BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

105
70
113

t = -2

t = -1

t=0

0%
0%
0%
0%
(0.875)

-4%
-4%
-5%
-1%
(0.770)

0%
(0.390)

-1%
(0.770)

-11%
0%
0%
-10%
(0.008)
11%
(0.000)
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Table A.6
Statistics related to CEO turnover following stock splits
For BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs, we report the medians for variables
related to CEO turnover following stock splits CEO Age is the age of the CEO at the end of the
split year. Years-to-Turnover is the number of years between the forward split and the CEO
turnover. Within 2 years is the percentage of firms that change their CEO within 2 years after
the forward split. Within 5 years is the percentage of firms that change their CEO within 5
years after the forward split. No Turnover is the percentage of firms that still have the same
CEO as of January 2013. CEO turnover statistics are calculated for BOTHs, FORWARDs and
FORWARD_NEG. Variables are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We report p-values for
the test of the null hypothesis that the medians (using a Wilcoxon test).
CEO turnover; No. (%)
CEO
Years-toWithin 2
Within 5
No
Sample
Age
Turnover
years
years Turnover
N
Post-split CEO turnover
BOTHs
165
52.0
4.0
55
108
25
(33%)
(65%)
(15%)
FORWARDs
110
53.5
7.0
19
48
29
(17%)
(43%)
(26%)
FORWARD_NEGs
154
54.0
6.0
15
68
53
(10%)
(44%)
(34%)
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
-1.5
-3.0
16%
22%
-11%
(0.457)
(0.000)
(0.003)
(0.000) (0.021)
BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs
-2
-2.0
23%
21%
-19%
(0.011)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000) (0.000)
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Table A.7
Operating performance, employment and investment
We present the post-split sharp decline for BOTHs. In Panel A, we report medians of operating
performance around forward stock splits for BOTHs, FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs.
Operating performance is reported for three consecutive years starting at t = 0 (split year). We
define ROA as operating income divided by cash-adjusted total assets. Panel A reports
operating performance. Panel B reports median ΔEMPL, ΔPPE, and ΔCAPE for BOTHs,
FORWARDs, and FORWARD_NEGs. Growth rates are calculated over two non-overlapping
periods—the two year post-forward split window and 3-4 years post-split window. Variables
are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We report p-values (in parenthesis) of the test of the
null hypothesis of equality of medians (using a Wilcoxon test).
N
t=0
t=1
t=2
Panel A. Operating performance (ROA)
BOTHs
FORWARDs
FORWARD_NEGs
BOTHs minus FORWARDs

231
211
211

BOTHs minus FORWARD_NEGs

2.5%
6.4%
6.1%

-4.0%
(0.000)
-3.6%
(0.000)

0.1%
5.8%
4.2%
-5.6%
(0.000)
-4.0%
(0.000)

-2.0%
4.5%
3.8%
-6.5%
(0.000)
-5.8%
(0.000)

Panel B. Post-split hiring and investment
N
BOTHs
202
FORWARDs
180
FORWARD_NEGs
170
BOTHs minus FORWARDs
BOTHs minus
FORWARD_NEGs

0-2 years after split
ΔEMPL ΔPPE ΔCAPE
-2%
9%
-46%
12%
38%
41%
11%
17%
-0.03%
-12%
-26%
-86%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-13%
-8%
-43%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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3-4 years after split
ΔEMPL ΔPPE ΔCAPE
-7%
-13%
-18%
6%
15%
0%
14%
13%
2%
-15%
-26%
-20%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017)
-21%
-26%
-20%
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

REFERENCES
Akerlof, 1970. The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488-500.
Armstrong, C.S., Jagolinzer, A.D. and Larcker, D.F., 2010. Chief executive officer equity
incentives and accounting irregularities. Journal of Accounting Research 48, 225–271.
Baber, W.R., Fairfield, P.M, and Haggard, J.A., 1991. The effect of concern about reported
income on discretionary spending decisions: The case of research and development.
The Accounting Review 66, 818-829.
Bacon, F.W., Salandro, D.P., and Shin, T.S., 1993. Management's view of reverse stock
splits. Financial Management Spring Issue, 18-19.
Barton J., and Simko, P.J., 2002. The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint.
The Accounting Review 77, 1-27.
Bartov E., 1993. The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting
Review 68, 840-855.
Bartov E., and Mohanram, P., 2004. Private information, earnings manipulations, and
executive stock-option exercises. The Accounting Review 79, 889-920.
Beneish, M.D., and Vargus, M.E., 2002. Insider trading, earnings quality, and accrual
mispricing. The Accounting Review 4, 755–791.
Bens, D.A., Nagar, V., and Wong, M.H.F., 2002. Real investment implications of
employee stock option exercises. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 359-393.
Bergstresser, D.B., and Philippon, T., 2006. CEO incentives and earnings management.
Journal of Financial Economics 80, 511–529.
Brennan, M.J., and Copeland, T.E., 1988. Stock splits, stock prices, and transaction costs.
Journal of Financial Economics 22, 83-101.
Bushee, B.J., 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment
behavior. The Accounting Review 73, 305-333.
Byun, J., and Rozeff, M.S., 2003. Long-run performance after stock splits: 1927 to 1996.
Journal of Finance 58, 1063–1085.
Chan, L.H., Chen, K.C.W., Chen. T., and Yu, Y., 2013. The effects of firm-initiated
clawback provisions on earnings quality and auditor behavior, Journal of Accounting
and Economics 54, 180-196.

67

Cheng, Q., and Warfield, T.D., 2005. Equity incentives and earnings management. The
Accounting Review 80, 441-476.
Cohen, D.A., and Zarowin, P., 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management
activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50,
2-19.
Collins V.D., Pungaliya, R.S., and Vijh, A.M., 2013. The effects of firm growth and model
specification choices on tests of earnings management in quarterly settings. American
Accounting Association working paper.
Dechow, P.M., and Skinner, D.J., 2000. Earnings management: Reconciling the views of
accounting academics, practitioners and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14, 235-250.
Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G., and Sweeney, A.P., 1995. Detecting earnings management.
The Accounting Review 70, 193-225.
DeFond, M.L., and Jiambalvo, J., 1994. Debt covenant violation and manipulation of
accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17, 145–176.
Desai, H., and Jain, P.C., 1997. Long run common stock returns following stock splits and
reverse splits. Journal of Business 70, 405-422.
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., and Swanson, E.P., 2007. Why do corporate managers misstate
financial statements? The role of in-the-money options and other incentives. Journal of
Financial Economics 85, 667-708.
Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., and Maydew, E.L., 2006. Is there a link between executive
equity incentives and accounting fraud?. Journal of Accounting Research 44, 113-143.
Erickson, M., and Wang, S., 1999. Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for
stock mergers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 27, 149–176.
Fama, E.F., and French, K.R., 1997. Industry costs of equity. Journal of Financial
Economics 43, 153-193.
Frydman, C. and Jenter, D., 2010. CEO compensation. Annual Review of Financial
Economics 2, 75-102.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole, 1995. A theory of income and dividend smoothing
based on incumbency rents, Journal of Political Economy 103, 75–93.
Grinblatt, M.S., Masulis, R.W., and Titman, S., 1984. The valuation effects of stock splits
and stock dividends. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 461-490.

68

Gong, G., Louis, H., and Sun, A.X., 2008. Earnings management and firm performance
following open-market repurchases. Journal of Finance 63, 947-986.
Guay, W.R., Kothari, S.P., and Watts, R.L., 1996. A market-based evaluation of
discretionary accrual models. Journal of Accounting Research 34, 83–105.
Guo, S., Liu, M.H., and Song, W., 2008. Stock splits as a manipulation tool: Evidence from
mergers and acquisitions. Financial Management 37, 695-712.
Han, K.C., 1995. The effects of reverse splits on the liquidity of the stock. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30, 159-169.
Hall, B.J., and Liebman, J.B., 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly
Journal of Economics 113, 653–691.
Hartzell, J.C., and Starks, L.T., 2003. Institutional investors and executive compensation.
Journal of Finance 58, 2351–2374.
Hazarika, S., Karpoff, J.M., and Nahata, R., 2012. Internal corporate governance, CEO
turnover, and earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 104, 44-69.
Healy, P.M., 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of
Accounting and Economics 7, 85–107.
Healy, P.M., and Wahlen, J.M., 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and
its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13, 365–383.
Herrmann, D., Inoue, T., and Thomas, W.B., 2003. The sale of assets to manage earnings
in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research 41, 89-108.
Holmström, B., and Milgrom, P., 1991. Multitask principal-agent analyses: incentive
contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 7, 24-52.
Holmström, B., 1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Review of
Economic Studies 66, 169-182.
Ikenberry, D.L., Rankine G., and Stice, E.K., 1996. What do stock splits really signal?.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 357-375.
Jensen G.R., Solberg, D.P. and Zorn, T.S., 1992. Simultaneous determination of insider
ownership, debt, and dividend policies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
27, 247-263.
Jensen, M.C., 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5-19.

69

Jensen, M.C., and Murphy, K.J., 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives,
Journal of Political Economy 98,225-264.
Jensen, M.C., and Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency
costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
John, K., and Lang, L.H.P., 1991. Insider trading around dividend announcements: Theory
and evidence. Journal of Finance 46, 1361-1389.
Jones, J., 1991, Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of
Accounting Research 29, 193–228.
Kaplan, S.N. and Minton, B.A., 2012, How has CEO turnover changed? International
Review of Finance 12, 57-87.
Ke B., Haddart S., and Petroni, K., 2003. What insiders know about future earnings and
how they use it: Evidence from insider trades, Journal of Accounting and Economics
35, 315-346.
Kedia, S. and Philippon, T., 2009. The economics of fraudulent accounting. Review of
Financial Studies 22, 2169-2199.
Kothari, S.P., Leone, A.J., and Wasley, C.E., 2005. Performance matched discretionary
accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 163–197.
Kothari, S.P., Mizik, N. and Roychowdhury, S., 2013. Managing for the moment: The role
of real activity versus accruals earnings management in SEO valuation. American
Accounting Association Working paper. Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lamoureux, C.G., and Poon, P., 1987. The market reaction to stock splits. Journal of
Finance 42, 1347-1370.
Lie, E., 2005. Operating performance following open market share repurchase
announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 411–436.
Louis, H., 2004. Earnings management and the market performance of acquiring firms.
Journal of Financial Economics 74, 121–148.
Louis, H., and Robinson, D., 2005. Do managers credibly use accruals to signal private
information? Evidence from the pricing of discretionary accruals around stock splits.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 39, 361-380.
McNichols, M., and Dravid. A., 1990. Stock dividends, stock splits, and signaling. Journal
of Finance 45, 857-879.

70

Perry, S., and Williams, T., 1994. Earnings management preceding management buyout
offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18, 157–179.
Peterson, D.R., and Peterson P.P., 1992. A further understanding of stock distributions:
The case of reverse stock splits. Journal of Financial Research 15,189–205.
Pulliam, S. and Barry, R., 2013. Executives hit stock-sales sweet spot. Wall Street Journal.
CCLXII (116).
Roychowdhury, S., 2006. Earnings management through real activities manipulation.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 42, 335-370.
Samaha, J., 2010. Criminal law, 10th edition, Cengage Learning.
Shivakumar, L., 2000. Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned
equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics 29, 339–371.
Spudeck, R.E., and Moyer, C.R., 1985. Reverse splits and shareholder wealth: The impact
of commissions. Financial Management 14, 52-56.
Teoh, S.H., Welch, I., and Wong, T.J., 1998a. Earnings management and the long-run
market performance of initial public equity offerings. Journal of Finance. 53, 1935–
1974.
Teoh, S.H., Welch, I., and Wong, T.J., 1998b. Earnings management and the
underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics. 50,
63–99.
Thomas, J.K., and Zhang, H., 2002. Inventory changes and future returns. Review of
Accounting Studies. 7, 163–187.

71

Chapter 3
Corporate governance, compensation plans and financial reporting
frauds: Doral financial corporation case study
I. Introduction
Doral Financial Corporation is a Puerto Rican bank holding company created in 1972.
Doral’s principal operations are conducted in Puerto Rico with growing business in New
York City and other United States areas. Doral offers a variety of financial services
through its subsidiaries1 including residential mortgages, commercial lending,
institutional securities, retail and online banking. Doral Financial was the leading
residential mortgage lender in Puerto Rico during 2000-2004. The volume of loans
originated and purchased by Doral Financial during 2003 and 2004 was approximately
$6.5 billion and $7.8 billion, respectively. Doral Financial's stock price (adjusted stock
price) sharply increased from approximately $10 ($85) per share in early 2000 to almost
$50 ($940) in early 2005 (with a couple of 3 for 2 forward stock splits). In 2002 U.S.
Banker ranked Doral Financial Corporation "The Best" out of the 100 largest banking
companies in the United States. Doral Financial's CEO has been selected among Forbes’s
list of Top 10 "Best Performing Bosses" in 2003 and 2004.2

1

Doral Financial has three wholly-owned subsidiaries, which are Doral Bank, Doral
Insurance Agency, Inc., and Doral Properties, Inc. Doral Bank has three wholly-owned
subsidiaries in operation, Doral Mortgage, LLC, Doral Money, Inc, principally engaged in
commercial lending in the New York metropolitan area, and CB, LLC, an entity incorporated to
dispose of a real estate project of which Doral Bank took possession during 2005.
The full story of Doral’s success and decline could be found at the following link
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp19837.pdf
2
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Doral has traditionally emphasized the origination of 15 to 30 years first mortgage
loans secured by single family residences. Doral used more flexible requirements for
income verification and credit history, hence such loans used to referred to as “nonconforming” according to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) or
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA).
Doral used to sell and securitize most of its originated and purchased residential
mortgage loans. Doral used to pay a pass through rate to loan purchasers. Mortgage
proceeds above the pass-through rate were retained by Doral as servicing rights and, any
excess over the servicing fees was recorded as interest-only strips (IOs). The main source
of Doral’s gains realized on the sale of the loans during the mentioned period was
determined by the difference between the sales price for the loan and its carrying amount.
During 2000-2004, Doral overstated income by $921 million or 100 percent on a pretax basis. Such financial reporting irregularities enabled Doral to place over $1 billion of
debt and equity and to report 28 consecutive quarters of record earnings.
In valuing IOs, Doral used to select the lowest of three valuations; one based on an
internal valuation model and two other third parties valuations. The SEC mentioned at
least four problems with the way this apparently reasonable accounting policy was
applied in practice. First, Doral Financial's internal model assumed that interest rates are
fixed rather than variable along the life of the underlying mortgage. Hence it used the
"spot rate" methodology to compute the value of its IOs rather than using the forward
curve.3 Second, Doral Financial's former treasurer and the former director emeritus
improperly influenced the third party valuation work. They used to provide inaccurate

3

Using the forward curve, internal model would have produced lower values of IOs.
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information to obtain results that were higher or similar to the valuations resulting from
the internal model. Third, Doral senior management was informed by late 2004 that the
market would value the IOs using the forward curve, however This information was not
appropriately communicated to the company's governing bodies or independent
accountants prior to the release of the financial results for the year ended December 31,
2004. Fourth, the former CEO and the former director emeritus used questionable
assumptions and flawed data to calculate a $97.5 million impairment charge to the IOs
for the fourth quarter of 2004, consequently the impairment was significantly
understated.
During 2000-2004, Doral recognized gains on sales of approximately $3.9 billion in
mortgages to FirstBank of Puerto Rico. These transactions were not classified as true
sales under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) because oral agreements
between the two firms contained different terms than those in the written contracts.
These oral recourse agreements or understandings with FirstBank were not reported in
Doral’s financial reporting process or appropriately communicated to the audit
committee, external auditors or the company's internal and external counsels.
Doral Financial's accounting and disclosure irregularities benefited the company in
different ways; they enabled the company to report 28 quarters of record earnings,
facilitated the placement of over $1 billion of debt and equity, and also enabled Doral to
pay millions of dollars less in interest on certain bond offerings. Furthermore, record
earnings justified dramatic increases in Doral’s senior executives’ compensations during
the mentioned period.
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Doral Financial admitted its use of the spot rate internal valuation model for the first
time in its 2004’s annual report which was filed after the close of the market on March
15, 2005. Closing stock price dropped $6.64 or 17% to $31.65 on March 16, $4.19 or
14% to $26.31 on March 17, and $4.89 or 19% to $21.50 on March 18, 2005. On April
19, 2005, Doral Financial announced that it had decided to incorporate forward curve in
IOs valuation and that this would decrease the value of its IOs portfolio by $400 to $600
million. Doral Financial's closing stock price dropped $0.70 or 4.6% to $16.15 on that
day. Doral’s stock price continued to plummet until it reached around $10 by the end of
2005.
Since learning of the above issues, Doral Financial's Board of Directors hired a new
management team, restated the company's financial reports and took other significant
remedial actions that we will show in our study. Doral Financial completed the
restatement process in February 2006. The restatements show that Doral’s income was
overstated by approximately $921 million on a pre-tax, cumulative basis during the
relevant period. Doral Financial attributed approximately $595.5 million of that amount
to the FirstBank true sale and contemporaneous purchase and sale issues, $283.1 million
to IO valuation issues and the remaining amount of approximately $42 million to four
other accounting adjustments.
Conducting case study in the context of earnings restatement firms has multiple
benefits. First, this enables us to thoroughly investigate compensation plans in a manner
not possible using archival type research. Annual reports provide communications
regarding incentive packages design and objectives that are not available in datasets like
ExecuComp. Second, the current setting enables us to study changes in compensation
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committee beliefs about the effectiveness of different components of compensation
packages. Finally, this setting enables us to investigate qualitative corporate governance
issues such as audit committee activities, committee members’ fields of experience and
the Board of Directors independence.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows; Section II briefly explains the
extant literature and develops hypotheses. Section III summarizes data sources. Section
IV reports analysis and results. And Section V concludes.

II. Literature review and hypothesis development.
We investigate three different but interrelated aspects associated with Doral
misstatement experience. First, we investigate whether Doral, besides misstating
earnings, participated in the complex chicanery described in Elnahas, Jain and McInish
(2014). Then, we investigate the relationship between Doral’s financial reporting
misstatement and executives’ compensations. Finally, we test how corporate governance
remedies could help fraudulent firms to restore their reputation. In this section, we
develop our hypotheses related to the three aforementioned aspects associated with Doral
misstatement.
A. Corporate greed: manipulation and self-select decisions.
There is a vast literature on how managers could manipulate investors’ and other
stakeholders’ perceptions about firms’ quality and prospects. Healy and Wahlen (1999)
define earnings management as “managers’ use of judgment in financial reporting and in
structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices”. The vast majority of the
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accounting literature focuses on detecting and investigating earnings management
through accruals manipulation (Jones, 1991; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and
Williams, 1994; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeny, 1995; Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996;
Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998b; Erickson and Wang,
1999; Shivakumar, 2000; Louis, 2004; Kothari, Leone, and Wasley, 2005; Efendi,
Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007; Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010).
A growing stream in accounting and finance literature asserts that managers use not
only accruals but also operational decisions to manipulate earnings. Managing earnings
through reducing expenditures on research and development (R&D) received special
attention (Baber, Fairfield, and Haggard, 1991; Bushee, 1998; Bens et al, 2002). Less
attention has been paid to another types of real earnings manipulation like overproduction
(Thomas and Zhang, 2002), timing of asset sales (Bartov, 1993) and sales manipulation
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Furthermore, Fudenberg, and Tirole (1995), Healy and Wahlen
(1999) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) show that managers could manage earnings
through sales acceleration, shipment schedules changes, and research and development
expenditure delays.
A more recent literature shows that managers use their discretion over several selfselect decisions to support earnings manipulation. Kedia and Philippon (2009) model the
economic consequences of earnings management and fraudulent accounting. They show
that manipulative firms not only manage earnings, but also over-invest and over-hire
during misreporting periods in order to pool with high productivity firms. They also show
that when mispricing is detected, firms shed labor and capital.
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Guo, Liu, and Song (2008) show that managers of acquiring firms use stock splits to
temporarily boost their stock prices particularly before stock financed acquisitions.
Similarly, Elnahas, Jain, and McInish (2014) show that managers use complex set of
manipulative tactics including earnings management, over hiring and stock splits to
justify spurious increases in their compensations and to achieve personal gains from
inside trading. Using stock splits to temporarily enhance stock price has been first
proposed by Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) who assert that under the optimal
trading range hypothesis, managers of overvalued firms might split their stocks to benefit
from the temporary price increase associated with split announcement.
For Doral financial corporation, we investigate the validity of the conjectures of
Kedia and Philippon (2009) and Elnahas, Jain, and McInish (2014). This leads to the
following set of hypotheses.
H1a. During misstatement period, Doral not only misstate accounts but also over
hired and overinvested in capital.
H1b. Doral management concurrently conducted forward stock split, negotiated
pay rises and participated in inside trading.
H1c. Following restatement announcement, Doral significantly shrunk by
shedding employees and capital.
B. Executive compensations as an incentive to financial reporting frauds.
The relationship between executives’ compensation and manipulation has received
considerable attention in the finance literature. On one hand, many papers show that
option compensation can align managerial interests with those of shareholders (Smith and
Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996). On the other
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hand, Hall and Liebman (1998) discuss the large and increasing median exposure of
CEOs’ wealth to firms’ stock prices. This exposure motivates managers to engage in
earnings management according to Cheng and Warfield (2005). Healy (1985) and
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) study earnings accrual policies followed by managers
and show that they are related to the incentives of their bonus contracts, suggesting that
managers manipulate their earnings to game their bonus plans. 4 Bartov and Mohanram
(2004) argue that top executives’ stock option exercises could create incentives for
manipulation and indicate future bad news. They argue that, option exercises represent
private information about future disappointing earnings, which, in turn, is a reversal of
pre-exercise artificially inflated reported earnings. Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson
(2007) also study the relationship between option compensations and financial reporting
misstatement. They show that having sizable holdings of in-the-money stock options
could act as an incentive to increase the likelihood of managerial manipulation.
We test the relationship between CEO compensation package design and
misstatement. For this purpose, we investigate several interrelated questions related to the
relationship between Doral’s executives’ compensations and misstatement. Does the
proportion of in-the-money options create managerial incentive to manipulate, does the
timing of option grants affect managerial misbehavior, and do BODs recognize the
relationship between executives’ compensations and misstatement. These questions lead
to the following set of hypotheses,

4

Apart from the Doral case discussed in the introduction, Diamond Foods is another
recent anecdotal example of the connection between earnings manipulation and cash bonus. The
top executives reaped manipulated earnings to beat earnings forecasts and reaped millions of
dollars in cash bonus and other compensation. See full story at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303848104579310690154877108.
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H2a. The proportion of in-the-money option holdings created an incentive for
Doral’s financial reporting misstatement.
H2b. The timing of option granting created an incentive for Doral’s financial
reporting misstatement.
H2c. Doral’s post-restatement BOD recognized the relationship between
executives’ compensation and misstatement and changed compensation policies
accordingly.
C. Corporate governance and restoring reputation.
There is a vast finance and accounting literature that deals with the relationship
between corporate governance and financial reporting frauds. Many of this literature have
been triggered by the accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom in early 2000s.
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1996) show that Boards of firms that commit financial
reporting misstatements are more likely dominated with insider “non-independent”
directors. Those firms are also less likely to have audit committees. Beasley (1996) also
find positive association between inside BOD members and financial reporting frauds.
Fewer studies investigate consequences of managerial decisions following the
detection of financial reporting frauds. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) reports positive
abnormal returns in a two days window following outside directors’ appointment.
Different from Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) who tests consequences of corporate
governance changes on a non-fraud context, a more recent study by Farber (2005)
address this issue in a fraudulent context. For a sample of 87 firms committed a financial
statement fraud, Farber (2005) investigate the association between post-fraud corporate
governance improvements and the reputation restoration by fraudulent firms. Farber
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(2005) finds that fraud firms that had weaker governance during the manipulation years
take several corrective governance actions subsequent to the fraud announcements. Those
corrective actions include the separation of CEO and Chairperson roles, increasing board
independence and increasing audit committee meetings. Farber shows that these
governance improvements help in restoring fraudulent firms’ reputation in a form of
higher institutional ownership, more analysts’ coverage, higher stock returns and lower
short interest.
Doral Financial Corporation case provides a perfect environment to test the
conjectures of Farber (2005). We test how Doral’s corporate governance changed after
the earnings statement announcement in 2005 and whether those changes -if any- helped
Doral to restore market participants’ trust. The above discussion leads to the following
set of hypotheses,
H3a. Doral post-restatement management undertook several corporate
governance remedies in a try to restore their pre-restatement good reputation.
H3b. the undertaken corporate governance remedies helped Doral to restore its
reputation through boosting firm value and increase analysts coverage.

III. Data
Doral Financial Corporation financial data is retrieved from the Compustat dataset.
Stock price data is acquired from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Senior executives’ compensations including bonuses, salaries, options and stock grants
are drawn from company’s “employment agreements and other compensation
arrangements” section of the proxy statements on SEC/Edgar filings. Data on insiders
trading have been retrieved from SEC/Edgar filings form4. Company proxy statements
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have also been used to acquire data on board of directors, audit committee and other
corporate governance variables. Analysts’ coverage data have been acquired from the
I/B/E/S database.
Table I summarize descriptive statistics for Doral Financial Corporation financial
data. We report descriptive statistics for three consecutive time periods; 1995-1999,
2000-2004, and 2005-2009. These three periods represent five years pre-manipulation,
manipulation and post-manipulation, respectively. Most statistics in Table I exhibits “n”
shape pattern through the three time periods. Doral experienced a dramatic explosion
with regard to size, leverage and number of employees during the earnings restatement
years. The firm starts to shed labor and capital at the beginning of year 2005. Doral
profitability measures also experience dramatic drop during years subsequent to the
restatement years. For example, return on investments (ROI) dropped from 7.23 % during
restatement years to -7.55 in the subsequent period. It is also worth noting that during the
restatement years, Doral did not change its dividend policy as measured by dividends
payout ratio. The mean dividends payout ratio is was 20.54 during 1995-1999. And it
remains almost constant during the restatement period.
IV. Analysis and Results
In this section, we investigate our three sets of hypotheses related to Doral
manipulation. We first show how Doral managers used discretion over self-select
decisions to support accounting misstatement. Then, we investigate how executives’
compensation packages could play an important role to trigger misstatement. We also
investigate whether Doral’s post-scandal BOD recognized the importance of changing
compensation policies. Finally, we test what corporate governance corrective actions the
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post-restatement BOD undertook and whether these actually help restoring Doral’s good
reputation.
A. Manipulation and the self-select decisions.
In this section, we investigate our first set of hypotheses regarding Doral use of selfselect decisions including over-hiring, over-investing and stock splits to support their
already overvalued stock price. During 2000-2004, In addition to around $1 billion in
earnings management, Doral hired excessive number of employees almost doubling the
strength from 1400 to 2600, and made excessive investments increasing PPE from $40
million to $150 million. These figures are consistent with the findings of Kedia and
Philippon (2009) that manipulative firms not only misstate reports but also try to pool
with good firms through over hiring and overinvestment.

Misstatement ends
04/19/2005

Salary increase (33 %)
2004

Selling stocks (21 %)
10/31/2003

10/15/2003

Split announcement

Selling stocks (17.5 %)
01/23/2003

Salary increase (20 %)
2002

Split announcement

08/15/2002

01/01/2000

Misstatement starts

Corporate action

Earnings restatement period

Figure 1. Doral’s self-select decisions.
During Doral’s earnings restatement period 2000-2004, we highlight the timing of Doral
stock split announcements, CEO salary increases and dates of CEO stock sales.
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Table I. Descriptive statistics
We report descriptive statistics for Doral financial corporation financial data. We report descriptive statistics for three
consecutive time periods; 1995-1999, 2000-2004, and 2005-2009. These three periods represent five years pre-manipulation,
manipulation and post-manipulation, respectively. Total asset is Compustat data item 6. LTD is firm’s total long term debt
(Compustat data item 9). Equity is the firm’s total common equity (Compustat data item 60). Sales is firm’s net sales
(Compustat data item 12). Employee is the total number of firm’s employees (Compustat data item 29). Net income is
Compustat data item 172. ROA is returns on assets defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to firm’s total
assets. ROE is the returns on equity defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to firm’s common equity. ROI
is returns on investments defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items divided by firm’s total invested capital.
Div Payout is dividends payout ratio defined as total dollar dividends divided by income before extraordinary items.
1995-1999
2000-2004
2005-2009
mean
median
StdDev
mean
median
StdDev
mean
median
StdDev
Total Asset
2266.62
1857.78
1493.58
9761.80
8421.68
4880.28
11766.07 10231.95
3228
LTD
202.52
161.36
144.64
1381.08
1484.84
507.74
1422.16
1387.44
320.90
Equity
223.88
186.94
104.06
713.12
711.36
234.77
494.34
459.61
186.55
Sales
182.01
135.41
104.01
693.94
711.62
166.64
713.25
646.84
207.03
Employees
1.05
0.98
0.32
2.11
2.07
0.41
1.51
1.38
0.46
Net Income
37.51
27.04
21.73
197.11
214.79
89.14
-144.20
-170.90
138.99
ROA
1.89
1.78
0.40
1.94
1.92
0.75
-1.67
-2.16
1.38
ROE
17.20
17.34
1.62
24.18
25.37
3.91
-44.72
-26.40
44.97
ROI
9.42
9.30
1.74
7.27
7.23
1.55
-7.55
-8.03
6.12
Div. payout 20.54
21.61
1.88
20.36
16.76
8.90
-67.22
0.00
148.46
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As a continuation of manipulation techniques to new levels, Doral announced a
couple of 3 for 2 stock splits effective September, 14th 2002 and December 12th 2003. A
stock split by itself is not an indicator of manipulation. It could just reflect managers’
over optimism regarding firm’s prospects. What raises the red flag is the CEO stock
trading around the stock split announcement. If stock split reflects managerial optimism,
then executives would have kept their stocks or even try to increase their ownership.
Figure 1 presents split announcement dates side by side with CEO compensation
increase times and CEO stock trading dates. Immediately after the first stock split, Doral
CEO negotiated 20% salary increase and sold around 17.5% of his stock ownership. The
same scenario occurred immediately after announcing the second stock split. Doral CEO
negotiated 33% increase in his salary and sold another 21% of his stock ownership. These
findings are consistent with the conjectures of Elnahas, Jain and McInish (2014) and with
our hypothesis H1b.
One year later during early 2005, Doral disclosure problems begun to surface. On
April 19th 2005 Doral announced its first earning restatement with more than $100
million. Doral announced around $ 1billion earnings restatement over the few months
following that announcement. After the financial shenanigans were exposed, Doral’s
stock price plummeted from around $50 to less than $1. The firm faced several
compliance and governance issues, including an SEC claim, an FDIC Cease and Desist
Order, and a class-action lawsuit as a result of the company’s share-price collapse.
New management team appointed in 2006 resolved many of these issues. Capital
and a large number of employees were shed as part of the corrective actions reducing
PPE to less than $100 million and employee strength to 1280.

85

Corporate action

Reverse stock split
08/20/2007

CEO change
08/25/2005

04/19/2005

Restatement
announcement

Misstatement ends

Forward stock split
12/12/2003

31/12/2004

Misstatement starts
01/01/2000

Restatement years

Date

Figure 2 (a). Corporate greed and complex chicanery.
This figure provides a graphical illustration of the dynamics described on Elnahas, Jain
and McInish (2014). This figure depicts the two stages involved in corporate
misstatement; the manipulation period includes earnings management and stock split and
the punishment period including SEC restatement, CEO and management team change
and is concluded by reverse stock split.

Figure 2 reports self-select decisions including stock split, employee’s growth, and
capital expenditure during Doral’s two episodes; the fake expansion and the dramatic
drop. Doral experience excessive employees and capital expenditure growth associated
with accounting manipulation years. Panels B and C also shows that Doral starts
Shedding employees and capital expenditure sharply after being exposed in April 19th
earnings restatement announcement (Kedia and Philippon, 2009).
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Figure 2 (b). Total number of Doral’s Employees 1999-2009.
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Figure 2(c). Doral’s holdings of Property, Plant and Equipment 1999-2009.
Figure 2. Self-select decisions.
This figure summarizes Doral self-select decisions that Doral managers undertook during
the restatement period 2000-2004. Panel (a) draws time line for stock splits, CEO
turnover and reverse split as described in Elnahas, Jain and McInish (2014). Panel (b) and
(c) presents the over hiring and overinvestment hypothesis of Kedia and Philippon
(2009), respectively.
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Panel A shows that Doral changed its CEO during August 2005 shortly after the
manipulation exposure (Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata, 2012). In general, these findings
lend strong support to our hypothesis H1c.
B. Executives compensation and financial reporting misstatement
In this section, we investigate the second set of hypotheses by testing the relationship
between executives’ compensations and financial reporting misstatement. For this
purpose, we study Doral’s compensation plans before, during and after the earnings
misstatement years of 2000-2004. Carefully studying compensation plans of firms that
want through earnings restatements and regulatory actions has several benefits; first, it
enables us to investigate interlinks between compensation plans and financial reporting
frauds. Second, it enables us to test whether certain compositions of compensation plans
could provide incentive for manipulative actions rather than for better performance.
Third, it provides a natural environment to test how firms design compensation plans
before and after manipulation announcements. Finally, the case study enables us to
carefully investigate not only amounts of the compensations – which could be studies
through archive type research- but also carefully studying terms and provisions of those
plans.
Table II summarizes Doral’s CEO’s compensation plans’ components during the
period 1992-2007. Seven contracts had been signed between Doral and its CEOs during
that period. Those contracts summarize the evolution of compensation philosophy of
Doral financial corporation. CEO salary which was $1m at the 1992-1994 contract, had
experienced a steady rise to become $2.4m at the 2003-2004 contract.
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Table II
CEO compensation contracts 1992-2008
We report components of compensation agreements that Doral entered into with CEOs during 1992-2007 period. Salary,
Salary is the dollar amount of annual CEO’s salary. Bonus is the CEO bonus components as listed in the employment
agreements. Bonus is calculated bases on Annual consolidated net income which is calculated as annual consolidated net
income after taxes and after adding back incentive compensation payable to executive officers. Equity based compensations
consists of any options grants or restricted stock awards for the CEO during the contract period. Max. Cash is the maximum
dollar amount of cash compensation (Salary + Bonus) that the CEO can receive during any calendar year covered by the
contract.
Plan
1

Starting
date
1/1/1992

Ending
Salary Bonus
date
12/31/1994 $1m
- 3/8 of 1% of the FV of mortgage loans on housing units other
than new project housing units in excess of $200 million.
- 3/16 of 1% of the FV of mortgage loans on new project housing
units in excess of $90 million.
- 25% of the Corporation's annual consolidated net income after
taxes; to the extent such net income exceeds an amount equal to a
15% ROE.

Equity
based
None

Max.
Cash
N/A

2

1/1/1995

12/31/1996 $0.7m - $1.0 million if the Company earns at least $10.0 million of Net
Income.
- 10% of the Company's annual consolidated net income in excess
of $10 million and up to $20 million to the extent such Adjusted
Net Income exceeds an amount equal to a 15% ROE.
- 15% of Adjusted Net Income in excess of $20.0 million to the
extent such Adjusted Net Income exceeds an amount equal to a
15% ROE.

None

$4.5m

3

1/1/1997

12/31/1999 $1.5m 15% of the amount of the Corporation's annual consolidated
adjusted net income in excess of an amount equal to a 15% ROE.

400,000
stock
options

$4.5

4

1/1/2000

12/31/2001 $1.5

none

$3m

15% of the amount of Doral Financial's annual consolidated
adjusted net income in excess of an amount equal to a 15% ROE.
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Table II: CEO compensation contracts 1992-2008 – Continued
5
1/1/2002 12/31/2003 $1.8
15% of the amount of Doral Financial's annual consolidated
adjusted net income in excess of an amount equal to a 15% ROE.

6

1/1/2004

12/31/2005 $2.4

7

5/23/2006 Annually
renewed

$1m

300,000
stock
options

$3.6

15% of the amount of Doral Financial's annual consolidated
adjusted net income in excess of an amount equal to a 15% ROE

600,000
Stock
options

$4.8

- a target bonus opportunity of 150% of base salary and a
maximum bonus opportunity of 200% of the target bonus, with a
guaranteed bonus of $1,500,000

200,000
restricted
stock
400,000
options

N/A
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The majority of the salary increase took place during 2000-2004 miss-statement
years. The firm bonus had experienced a major change starting from 1997’s contract.
Prior to 1997, the compensation committee considered volume and profitability as two
important aspects to connect CEO’s bonus with. As a result, part of CEO’s bonus was
connected to Loan origination and the other part was connected to return on shareholders’
equity. Starting from 1997 contract, the firm changed the way of bonuses calculation. It
eliminated the incentive bonus for obtaining minimum volume. Doral justified this
change by indicating that “incentives for volume of originations were eliminated because
the Committee felt that these incentives were less appropriate for a larger and more
mature company such as the Corporation”. Although, Doral’s option plan – adopted
since October, 26 1988- permits the firm to grant options to executives, Doral did not
grant any options to CEO during 1992 – 1998 period. The firm starts to grant options to
CEO as part of the compensation package at the fourth quarter of 1999. During 19992004, Doral granted 1.3 millions stock options to CEO.
From the above discussion, we can identify three major changes in Doral’s
executives’ compensations shortly prior to the start of the manipulation years. First the
firm changed the base of bonus calculation to exclude volume based criterion. Second, it
reduced the cash cap from being three times as of salary to become only twice. Finally,
and most importantly, it started to grant stock options as part of the executives’
compensation package. Although the firm argued that options grants are used to align
executives’ interests with those of shareholders, we argue that the magnitude and timing
of option grants could be seen as one of incentives to earnings misstatements.
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Starting at year 2000, stock options start to play an increasingly significant role in
forming executives’ incentives. Figure 3 exhibits cash versus in-the-money stock option
value over the period 1998-2006. The value of exercisable stock options – which
constitutes 50% of CEO’s total compensation in year 2000- increased dramatically to
represent around 90% of CEO total compensation during years 2003 and 2004.

Percentage out of total compensation

100%
90%

80%
70%
60%
50%

40%
30%
20%
10%

0%
1998

1999

2000

2001
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% option portfolio

year

Figure 3. Cash versus in the-money option compensations 1998-2006

Doral’s compensation committee in 2002’s annual report stated that “The Committee
felt it was appropriate to reduce the amount of stock options in light of the increase in
cash compensation in the form of base salary and incentive bonus”. And that “the base
annual salary was increased from $1,500,000 to $1,800,000, the maximum incentive
bonus was also increased from $1,500,000 to $1,800,000 and the number of stock options
was reduced from 400,000 to 300,000”. These statements implicitly assumed the
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equivalency of cash compensations and stock options granted to executives. In fact, cash
compensations and stock options compensations are in stark difference. Firstly, incentive
created by cash starts when the cash is promised and ends when the cash is received by
managers. On the other hand, Incentive created by options is extended as long as the
manager keeps his options unexercised. Second, incentive from cash is not accumulated
like stock options. New options granted and old “un-executed” options jointly constitute
managers’ incentive that is connected to stock price movements. So, reducing option
grants from 400,000 - old and unexecuted- to 300,000 can also be seen as an increase of
the CEO stock options portfolio to 700,000. This accumulation of stock options possibly
distorted top management incentives and led to an agency costs not accounted for when
designing the compensation plans.
Executives’ incentives might be distorted by the dominance of stock options as the
main component of executives’ compensation package. If managers over focus on
increasing stock prices over specific time period, they might participate in behaviors that
transfer value from future shareholders and managers to the incumbent ones. Financial
reporting misstatement could be one form of such behaviors. These findings are
consistent with Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) who show that managers with
more in-the-money options are more likely to participate in earnings misstatement. These
results also lend support to hypothesis H2a that the proportion of in-the-money option
holdings might have created an incentive for Doral’s financial reporting misstatement.
Timing of the options grants also represents an important aspect in executives’
options granting strategy. Granting options immediately preceding earnings
announcements and other important events’ announcements could affect the possibility
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that managers falsify the announcement for their own benefits. Figure 4 highlights
Doral’s CEO’s options granting dates during 1999-2006 window.

Option grant “1”
400,000 stock
options. 12/22/1999.

Option grant “2”
300,000 stock
options.
03/05/2002.

1999

2001

2000

1999 earnings
announcement.
01/14/2000.

2002

2002 “Q1” earnings
announcement.
04/15/2002.

Option grant “3”
600,000 stock
options. 01/01/2004.

2003

2004

2003 earnings
announcement.
01/14/2004.

Figure 4. Timing of option grants

Doral granted three batches of stock options to its CEO1 during 1999-2006. These
batches consist of 400,000, 300,000 and 600,000 stock options during 1999, 2002 and
2004, respectively.
As shown in figure 4, the timing of granting those options used to immediately
precede the corporate earnings announcements. This timing possibly participated to
Doral’s regularity of announcing record earnings during the 2000-2004 miss-statement
years. This timing issue lends support to hypothesis H2b that the timing of option

1

Doral’s options used to be granted not only for the CEO but also for the top five executive officers.
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granting might have created an incentive for Doral’s management to participate in
earnings misstatement.
We investigate whether the above problems have been recognized by Doral’s new
board of directors after the earnings restatements and the passage of turbulence years. We
investigate Doral’s new compensations plans during the years following the restatements.
Several changes have been added to Doral’s compensation plans. First, the firm started to
use performance vesting in addition to time vesting requirements for stock options
granted. This enables the firm to forfeit granted options if certain business objectives are
not met properly. Second, the firm adopted a new vesting system at which options
granted vested gradually over longer time periods rather than being vested all at specific
date. Third, the compensation committee stated clearly that the equity based
compensations should not be granted immediately before earnings announcement or any
other important corporate announcements. Fourth, the firm started to schedule the
payment of bonuses rather than paying them all at once. 50% of CEO’s bonus is divided
into two postponed installments. The payment of these installments is contingent on the
company remaining well capitalized on the date of payment of the two pending
installments. Finally, compensation committee added a retroactive claw back provision to
the bonus plan. Under this provision, the full bonus amount is subject to a claw back in
the event that the company is affected by any enforcement action imposed by its
regulators. Doral’s compensations committee stated several factors as determinants of
stock options awards to top executives. These factors include shares available for grant
under the Stock Plan, the executive’s position in Doral Financial, his or her contributions
to our objectives and total compensation. Our analysis assumes that, firms should also
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take executives’ existing unexecuted options into consideration when designing
compensation plans. Since options grants should be designed to link part of executives’
compensation to stock price. Boards of directors should carefully specify this part taking
into consideration new as well as old unexecuted in-the-money stock options. In general,
these changes are consistent with hypothesis H2c. It seems that Doral’s new management
recognizes the importance of the role that compensation plans might have played in
distorting executives’ incentives during the manipulation period.
C. Corporate governance remedies and restoring reputation.
In this section, we study two related issues; first, what corporate governance
improvements did Doral’s post-restatement management undertake to restore good
reputation. Second, whether these corporate governance remedies helped Doral to
actually restore its reputation. Table III reports and Figure 5 exhibits a track of Doral’s
corporate governance mechanisms over the period 1993-2012.
Doral manipulated its statements during the five years period 2000-2004. Consistent
with conjectures of Farber (2005), Doral start to adopt corporate governance changes
when their manipulations start to surface in 2005. Before 2005, Doral’s CEO and
chairperson positions used to be held by the same person. This role duality has been
ended shortly after the earnings restatement in 2005. The BOD size as well as formation
has also experienced an improvement during 2005. The number of board members
increased from 9 to 11 and the percentage of outside board members has also jumped
from 66% to 90%. One aspect that Doral’s management did not made significant
improvement in is the composition and the activity of the audit committee.
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Table III
Doral financial corporation corporate governance
We report a track of corporate governance of Doral Financial Corporation over the period
1993-2012. Dual is role duality dummy variable, it takes the value “1” when the same person
serves as CEO and board chairperson, and “0” otherwise. BOD is the size of the board of
directors measured as the number of BOD members. Independ. The board of directors’
independence measured as the proportion of outside “non-executive” directors in the board of
directors. Meet is the number of audit committee meetings during the year as announced in the
firm’s 10-k. Aud. Com. Is the number of members of the audit committee
Indep
Aud.
Indep
Aud.
year
Dual BOD end.
meet Com. year
Dual BOD end.
meet Com.
1993 1
8
0.625 2
2
2003 1
9
0.666 7
4
1994 1
8
0.625 3
2
2004 1
9
0.666 7
5
1995 1
8
0.625 2
2
2005 0
11
0.909 18
5
1996 1
8
0.625 1
2
2006 0
10
0.9
38
5
1997 1
8
0.625 1
2
2007 0
10
0.9
4
5
1998 1
8
0.625 2
2
2008 0
10
0.9
4
6
1999 1
8
0.625 4
3
2009 0
10
0.9
4
7
2000 1
8
0.625 2
4
2010 0
7
0.857 4
5
2001 1
8
0.625 4
3
2011 0
6
0.833 13
3
2002 1
8
0.625 7
3
2012 0
6
0.833 4
3

The number of audit committee members has not changed after the manipulation
detection. Audit committee - that used to meet on average 5 times a year during the
manipulation years- conducted exceptionally more meetings during the restatement years
of 2005 and 2006. However, the activity of the committee returns to pre-restatement level
after the restatement years. This result indicates that increasing audit committee activities
might be seen as an emergency remedy rather than a permanent change in firm’s
corporate governance. These corporate governance improvements are consistent with the
findings of Farber (2005) and with also with hypothesis H3a. Farber (2005) further shows
that fraudulent firms successfully restore their reputation after corporate governance
improvements. This restoration takes the form of increasing stock price and analysts’
coverage.
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Figure 5: Doral’s corporate governance 1993-2012
Figure 6 exhibits Doral’s unadjusted as well as adjusted stock price during the period
1993-2013. Doral’s stock price experienced a dramatic decline that started with the
earnings restatement announcement in mid-2005. Stock price continued to decline
regardless of corporate governance improvements undertaken by the management. This
result is further confirmed by investigating analysts’ coverage data. Figure 7 tracks the
number of analysts that follow Doral over time. Data is available starting at 2003. The
number of analysts following Doral reached its beak in 2005. After the restatement
announcement the number of analysts started to decline dramatically. The evidence in
Figures 6 and 7 is neither consistent with the findings of Farber (2005) nor with
hypothesis H3b. These results show that Doral changes in corporate governance was
neither enough to restore analysts attention nor to curb stock price plummeting.
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Figure 6. Doral’s stock price performance 1993-2013.
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V. Conclusion
During 2000-2004 periods, Doral Financial Corporation, a leading Puerto Rican
banking holding company, overstated income by $921 million or 100 percent on a pre-tax
income. Such financial reporting irregularities enabled Doral to place over $1 billion of
debt and equity and to report 28 consecutive quarters of record earnings. In this study, we
investigate three aspects related to Doral’s manipulation. First, we test the conjectures of
Kedia and Philippon (2009) and Elnahas, Jain, and McInish (2014) that managers of
manipulative firms use their discretion over self-select decisions like hiring, investing and
stock splits to further support their stock prices. Second, we investigate the relationship
between executives’ compensation and reporting misstatement. Finally, we investigate
the use of corporate governance mechanisms by restating firms to restore their reputation.
Our results show that Doral management might have used stock splits to further
boost stock price in order to be able to negotiate salary increases and to achieve personal
gains through inside trading. Doral management also expanded with regard to hiring and
capital investment beyond their optimal capacity. Our results also show that both the
proportion of in-the-money options and the timing of option grants might have played a
significant role in forming Doral’s management incentives during the manipulation
period. After Doral’s restatement announcement a new management came to the office.
This new management adopted multiple corporate governance enhancements such as
chair/CEO role separation and increase board size and independence. Investigating
Doral’s post-remedies price movements and analysts’ coverage show that corporate
governance remedies undertakes were not enough to restore Doral’s good pre-restatement
reputation.
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